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Notes
Someone is Watching:
The Need for Enhanced Data Protection
Nic

ROETHLISBERGER*

The computer revolution has created a world where communication is cheap and
instantaneous,and where vast amounts of information and consumer goods are just a
click away. It also has created a world where the electronic gadgets we use every day
create a trail of information that is being collected, examined, sold, and-far too
often-stolen. Individuals have little to no control over the use and sale of this
personal, private information, and the law has failed to keep pace. Some privacy
advocates have suggested that traditionalprivacy torts should be used by the courts to
stop the worst of these privacy invasions. However, these torts, developed more than
fifty years ago, are ill-suited to the task. In addition, many states and the federal
government have passed laws and regulations to protect the most sensitive of private
information from prying eyes. But these laws have proven to be inadequate in a rapidly
changing world of iPhones, Netflix, and Internet searches. What is needed is a national
standardthat will protect the privacy of individuals without stifling innovation. A ban
on the dissemination of private information, along with more stringent laws meant to
prevent identity theft, will go a long way to achieving these twin goals.

* J.D., University of California, Hastings College of the Law, 2oll; B.A., San Francisco State
University, 2004. I would like to thank to my wife, Dhyana Levey, for her help and patience through
the process of writing this Note, and for the gift of our baby girl, Audrey Roethlisberger. I would also
like to thank Professor John Diamond for his early suggestions and the San Francisco Giants for
making my last year of law school bearable.
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INTRODUCTION

Whenever you visit a website, buy a book, shop for groceries,
conduct a Google search, buy a magazine, or vote in an election, a person
or software program is likely watching-and making note of your
activities. A surprising amount of information about you is stored in
private databases, and that information is not just collecting digital dust.
This data is being used by the company that collected it, and is often
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aggregated with other information about you and then sold. And,
sometimes, it's stolen.'
Commercial data collection is nothing new. Companies have been
exploiting data for sales and research purposes for decades.! However, in
the last few decades, this data collection has become big business. Firms
collect mountains of data and assemble what Daniel Solove calls "digital
dossiers," 3 which contain a large amount of seemingly private
information including Social Security numbers, date of birth, household
income, health information, occupation, book preferences, religion, and
dress size.4 The storage and use of this information has become a major
profit center for businesses, and for some, this data is the most important
asset they own.5
A recent Wall Street Journal investigation of the fifty most popular
websites found that all of them-except the nonprofit site Wikipediainstall "intrusive consumer-tracking" software on the computers of those
who visit the sites. Two thirds of the files installed on the user's
computer, often without their knowledge, came from companies that
exist solely to collect the information of Internet users.! And the tracking
goes far beyond merely recording the websites that a person visits. Some
files record keystrokes; others "can re-spawn" after they have been
deleted."

I. A recent survey on identity fraud found that 4.8% of the U.S. population has suffered from
fraud. See RrrA TEHAN, DATA SECURITY BREACHES: CONTEXT AND INCIDENT SUMMARIES (2008), for a list
of recent data losses; see also Chronology of Data Breaches: Security Breaches 2oo5-Present,PRIVACY
http://www.privacyrights.orglar/ChronDataBreaches.htm
RIGHTS CLEARINGHOUSE (Apr. 15, 201)
(providing a continually updated list of data losses and breaches).
2. See DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION
AGE 16-17 (2006) (discussing that as early as the 1920s, General Motors used information on Ford
customers to entice them to buy a General Motors vehicle); ALAN F. WESTIN & MICHAEL A. BAKER,
DATABANKS IN A FREE SOCIETY: COMPUTERS, RECORD-KEEPING, AND PRIVACY 3-5 (972).
3. SOLOVE, supranote 2, at I.

4. Privacy and Consumer Profiling,

ELECTRONIC PRIVACY INFORMATION CENTER,

http://epic.org/

privacy/profiling (last visited July 4, 2011). Collected information is then sifted and sorted to place

people into categories sold to marketers. For example, Claritas, one company that collects data and
uses it to create "dossiers" on individuals, divides people into fifteen categories with whimsical names
like "Landed Gentry." These categories are further broken down into subcategories. Landed Gentry is
divided into "Country Squires," "God's Country," "Big Fish Small Pond," and "Greenbelt Families."
Id.
5. CHARLES H. KENNEDY, THE BUSINESS PRIVACY LAw HANDBOOK I (2oo8); see Steve Lohr, A
Data Explosion Remakes Retailing, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 3, 20Io, at BU3. Lohr's article discusses how
retailers use "internal sources including point-of-sale and shipment-tracking information, as well as

census data and syndicated services" to improve their ability to target customers. Additionally, Lohr
shows that retailers "also track online visitors to Web commerce sites, members of social networks like
Facebook and browsers using smartphones." Id.

6. Julia Angwin and Tom McGinty, Personal Details Exposed via Biggest U.S. Websites, WALL
ST. J., July 31, 2oo, at At.

7. Id.
8. Id.
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The technology that facilitates this tracking is only getting better.
New technologies are increasing the amount and detail of data that can
be collected. For example, the new web-browsing standard, HTML 5,
will allow for increased tracking and data collection.' Smartphones are
also becoming a major worry for privacy advocates. An investigation into
the ioi most popular smartphone applications showed that fifty-six of
them transmitted the phone's unique user ID number, which cannot be
changed.'o A further forty-seven transmitted the phone's location and
five sent age, gender, and other personal information to outside
vendors."
Companies use this data in three ways, each with its own particular
privacy concerns. First is the collection of data. This can include simply
requesting information at the point of customer contact or seeking out
the information in places such as public records. But the Internet and
smartphones allow companies to go far beyond these rudimentary datacollection techniques. Second is the in-house use of that data. Many
companies collect their own customer information and use it for their
business needs. Amazon.com is a good example: The online shopping
site uses customers' purchasing data to make product recommendations
and improve search capabilities."
Finally, and most worryingly, companies sell this data to third
parties. 3 This activity is particularly disturbing because a company with
which the consumer has no relationship, and that they may never have
heard of, has access to vast amounts of her personal information. Indeed,
by 1995 there were already five database compilers with data on almost
every household in the United States. 4 The Internet enables companies
to sort and combine information in ways never before possible." This

9. Tanzina Vega, Web Code Offers New Ways to See What Users Do Online, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. I I,
2oo, at AI; see also Jessica E. Vascellaro, Suit to Snuff Out "History Sniffing" Takes Aim at Tracking
Web Users, WALL ST. J., Dec. 6, 20o0, at Bi (showing that some websites use "history sniffing" to
figure out what other sites the visitor has gone to); Tanzina Vega, Code That Tracks Users' Browsing

Prompts Lawsuits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 20o0, at B3.

to. See ERIC SMITH, IPHONE APPLICATIONS & PRIVACY ISSUES: AN ANALYSIS OF APPLICATION
TRANSMISSION OF IPHONE UNIQUE DEVICE IDENTIFIERS (UDIDs) (2010); Scott Thurm and Yukari
Iwatani Kane, Your Apps Are Watching You, WALL ST. J., Dec. 18, 201o, at CI.
II. Thurm, supra note so, at CI.
12. See Laurie J. Flynn, Like This? You'll Hate That (Not All Web Recommendations Are
Welcome), N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2006, at CI.

13. The Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has a helpful graphical representation showing how
personal data is collected and distributed to data brokers who then deliver the data to entities who use
it for a wide range of purposes. Personal Data Ecosystem, FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/workshops/
privacyroundtables/personalDataEcosystem.pdf (last visited July 4, 201); see also FTC, STAFF REPORT:
SELF-REGULATORY PRINCIPLES FOR ONLINE BEHAVIORAL ADVERTISING (2009) [hereinafter FTC STAFF
REPORT].
14. ARTHUR M. HUGHES, THE COMPLETE DATABASE MARKETER 354 (1996).
15. See generally FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 13.
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includes the ability to track online behavior and tailor advertising to fit
with websites recently visited by the user." For example:
[T]he information about the consumer's activities on [a] travel website
could be combined with information about the content that the
consumer viewed on [a] newspaper's website. The advertisement
served could then be tailored to the consumer's interest in, not just
New York City, but also baseball (e.g., an advertisement referring to
the New York Yankees)."
The fact that this information is falling into many different hands
with varying levels of protection inevitability leads to another major
privacy concern: data loss. Sometimes data is lost through carelessness,
and sometimes it is stolen by those who hope to exploit it for criminal
gain. Because of the sheer volume of information maintained by some
companies, one incident can expose millions of people to identity theft.
In June 2005, credit card processing company CardSystems Solutions,
Inc. admitted to one of the largest data breaches in history.' 8 About forty
million cardholders' credit card information was stolen when the
company's computer systems were breached. More recently, a 28-yearold college dropout was convicted of stealing information from more
than 130 million credit and debit cards by hacking into the computer
systems of retailers such as 7-Eleven.
This Note will concentrate on legal academics' attempts to address
these problems through common law torts, the current state of the
relevant statutory and administrative law, and why further action by
Congress is the best solution to the problems posed by data collection,
use, sale, and theft. Creating straightforward, easily implemented rules
that safeguard the public from the most worrisome of violations, while
protecting the profits of industries that are increasingly driving positive
innovation, should be the goal. Part I discusses the failure of privacy tort
law to address these issues. Part II argues that a cause of action for
breach of confidence should not be extended to cover dissemination of
private information. Part III explains why creating a property right in
personal information would conflict with basic ideas of intellectual
property. Part IV discusses the current state of statutory and
administrative law at both the federal and state level. Finally, Part V
proposes that extending current law is the best way to prevent the worst
invasions of privacy.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 3. One version of this technique is called "retargeting" or "remarketing," where a
particular item viewed online follows the consumer around through display ads, encouraging her to go
back and buy it. Miguel Helft & Tanzina Vega, Seeing That Ad on Every Site? You're Right. It's
Tracking You, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 30, 20oo, at At.
i8. Eric Dash, Lost CreditData Improperly Kept, Company Admits, N.Y. TIMEs, June 20, 2005, at
Ai.
19. Donna Goodison, Decade of Lost Identities, BOSTON HERALD, Dec. 26, 2009, at 19.
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THE PRIVACY TORTS

Some scholars have advocated the use of the traditional privacy
torts as a solution to the data collection and trading problem. The
traditional beginning of modern privacy protection in the United States
stems from Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis's The Right to Privacy,
published in 1890.2o Called the most influential law review article ever
written," it laid the foundation for modem privacy law by asking that
courts begin to enforce new privacy torts so that people would have the
right "to be let alone."" By 1960, the right to privacy in some form was
recognized in the vast majority of states." At that time, William Prosser
distilled the mountain of privacy jurisprudence developed over the
preceding seventy years into the four torts now recognized by modern
courts:24 intrusion upon seclusion," public disclosure of private facts,"
false light,27 and appropriation of likenessi
Unfortunately, these torts do "little to protect against the collection,
use, and dissemination" of personal information." As discussed below,
this is because the three torts most likely to be of use in these
situations -intrusion upon seclusion, public disclosure of private facts
and misappropriation-have serious limitations.3 o While there are
indications that courts may be willing to use the intrusion upon seclusion
tort in cases involving spyware," it is unlikely to be applied more broadly
because in most circumstances the user is giving up the information
voluntarily. Similarly, limitations on the public disclosure tort make it
difficult to use in all but the most extreme violations of privacy. The tort
has also come under more fundamental attack for being almost certainly
unconstitutional.32 Of the four privacy torts, appropriation is the most
20. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV.

193

(1890).

21. Harry Kalven, Jr., Privacy in Tort Law-Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs. 326,327 (1966).

22. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 195.
23. William L. Prosser, Privacy,48 CAL. L. REv. 383, 38688 (1960).

24. Id. at 389.
25. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
26. Id. § 652D.
27. Id. § 652E.
28. Id. § 652C.
29. Robert Sprague & Corey Ciocchetti, Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying
Information Through Enhanced Privacy Policiesand Laws, 19 AIB. L.J. Sci. &TECH. 91, 112 (2009).
30. The false light tort is unlikely to be of much use because it protects against information that
portrays someone in a false way. With databases, however, it is the accuracy of the information that is

the problem, not its falsity. See Sarah Ludington, Reining in the Data Traders:A Tort for the Misuse of
PersonalInformation, 66 MD. L. REV. 140, 165-66 (2oo6).
31. See Don Corbett, Virtual Espionage: Spyware and the Common Law Privacy Torts, 36 U.
BALT. L. REV. I, 24-31 (2oo6) (discussing how a plaintiff might successfuly argue a claim of intrusion
upon seclusion against the user of spyware).

32. Erwin Chemerinsky, Protecting Truthful Speech: Narrowing the Tort of Public Disclosure of
PrivateFacts, II CHAP. L. REV. 423, 424-26 (2oo8). Even the Restatement (Second) of Torts contains a
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likely to protect against some of the activities of database managers, but
it too is almost certain to fail."
A.

INTRUSION UPON SECLUSION

The tort of intrusion upon seclusion protects against the invasion of
personal space, as well as the interest in solitude and seclusion.34 The tort
of public disclosure of private facts, on the other hand, protects against
the unauthorized disclosure of facts and has little to do with how those
facts were obtained." This distinction makes intrusion upon seclusion
most relevant in the collection of database information, rather than in
the use, sale, or theft of the information.
The intrusion tort requires four elements: (i) The invasion must be
intentional, (2) the matter intruded upon must be private, (3) the intrusion
must be highly offensive to a reasonable person, and (4) the intrusion must
cause anguish and suffering.36 These elements create significant hurdles to
maintaining a cause of action against a company for collecting personal
information. In particular, the requirements that the intrusion be into a
private matter and that it be "highly offensive" to a reasonable person
create almost insurmountable barriers.
The private matter requirement is strictly enforced, and a plaintiff
must prove that she had a reasonable expectation of privacy." The
comments to the Restatement (Second) show that there is no liability for
giving further publicity to what the plaintiff leaves open to the public.39
The question is how the information was collected, not necessarily what
the information is." Merely aggregating information voluntarily given to
a company would not be covered by this tort, and collecting information
about what one does in public-such as buying groceries, voting, putting
something up on Facebook, or simply the location of a person in publicis almost certainly not covered.
For example, in Dwyer v. American Express Co.,4 o American
Express cardholders filed a class action lawsuit against the credit card
company alleging invasion of privacy. American Express was renting out
warning about the potential unconstitutionality of the tort. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652D special note (1977) ("It has not been established with certainty that liability of this nature is
consistent with the free-speech and free-press provisions of the First Amendment to the Constitution,
as applied to state law.").
33. See Ludington, supra note 3o, at 166-71.
34. Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 494 (1975); see Prosser,supra note 23, at 389.
35. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. a (1977).
36. Snakenberg v. Hartford Cas. Ins. Co., 383 S.E.2d 2, 6 (S.C. Ct. App. 1989); RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
37. Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469,490 (Cal. 1998).
38. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B cmt. c (977).
39. However, the type of information collected could have a bearing on the "highly offensive"
requirement.
40. 652 N.E.2d 1351 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995).
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information on its customers' spending habits.' Specifically, the action
sought damages on a theory of intrusion upon seclusion.42 But the
Appellate Court of Illinois held that the company's actions did not
involve intrusion into a private matter.43 The court reasoned that
By using the American Express card, a cardholder is voluntarily, and
necessarily, giving information to defendants that, if analyzed, will
reveal a cardholder's spending habits and shopping preferences. We

cannot hold that a defendant has committed an unauthorized intrusion
by compiling the information voluntarily given to it and then renting its
compilation."
The court in Dwyer favorably cited Shibley v. Time, Inc.45 In Shibley, the
Court of Appeals of Ohio held that magazine publishers were not liable
for selling their subscriber information to direct mail advertisers. 6
The requirement that the intrusion be highly offensive also makes it
unlikely that a court would allow a claim of intrusion upon seclusion. The
law protects objectively normal sensibilities, not subjectively heightened
sensitivity.47 This element also requires that the intrusion cause "mental
suffering, shame, or humiliation to a person of ordinary sensibilities."4' It
is difficult argue that simple collection of information freely given to a
company would amount to something so "highly offensive" to a
reasonable person. The key to this element is that the intrusion is not just
unpleasant or something people would rather avoid, but highly offensive.
This requirement is a major obstacle for any plaintiff alleging intrusion
for collecting the kind of information found in most databases:49 "Each
particular instance of collection is often small and innocuous; the danger
is created by the aggregation of information, a state of affairs typically
created by hundreds of actors over a long period of time." 0
It is also relevant that the more common an activity becomes-and
the more the population accepts the practice-the less likely it is that a
court would find such an activity to be highly offensive:"' "The reasonable
41. Albert B. Crenshaw, Credit CardHolders to Be Warned of Lists, WASH. POST, May 14, 1992, at

Dii ("American Express segments its card holders into six tiers, ranging from the least affluent,
'value-oriented' customers to the most affluent, which it calls 'Rodeo Drive Chic."').
42. Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1353.
43. Id. at 1354.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 1355 (citing Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975)).
46. Id. at 339.
47. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (1977).
48. McGuire v. Shubert, 722 A.2d 1o87, 1092 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998).

49. Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databasesand Metaphors for Information
1432 (2001).
50. Id. (citing Tureen v. Equifax, Inc., 571 F.2d 411, 416 (8th Cir. 1978) (holding that obtaining
past insurance history is not tortious); Seaphus v. Lilly, 691 F. Supp. 127, 132 (N.D. Ill. 1988)
(obtaining a person's unlisted telephone number); Shibley, 341 N.E.2d at 339 (obtaining magazine
subscription lists)).
5t. See Shulman v. Group W Prods., Inc., 955 P.2d 469, 490 (Cal. 1998) (holding that a camera
Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393,
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person standard incorporates society's expectations of what matters
should be protected as private."" And as social expectations change, so
too does what is considered to be highly offensive." "[C]ourts define
privacy by reference to society's prevailing understanding of what is a
reasonable expectation of privacy. Because this conception of privacy
tracks societal expectations, what is protected as private will vary in
accordance with relevant social changes." 54
A recent study sought to gauge public opinion on the collection of
private web-surfing information for use in targeted advertising, an
activity that worries privacy-rights activists." The data indicate that a
strong majority of people do not want advertising targeted at them. 6 The
number of those who are "not OK" with targeted advertising rises from
sixty-six percent to seventy-three percent when they are told the
information for the targeting came from the website they were visiting."
This is a classic in-house use of private data. However, even though
three-fourths of the population might be uncomfortable with use of inhouse information for targeted advertising, that does not make it highly
offensive. Other consumers have noted that they actually like some of
the most invasive tracking as it allows them to see ads and products
tailored to their personal interests. And as the practice of collecting
information from customers becomes more common, courts are unlikely
to find the practice to be highly offensive.
The problems with establishing that the activities intrude on a
private sphere, that the intrusion was highly offensive, and that the
activities rise to the level of an intrusion at all, seem to be almost
insurmountable bars to using the intrusion tort in the collection of
private information.
B.

PUBLIC DISCLOSURE OF PRIVATE FACTS

The tort of public disclosure of private facts protects against the
disclosure of private information. This is unlike the tort of intrusion upon
seclusion, which protects people from the intrusion into their private
lives in the first place. This tort would most likely be used to stop the sale
crew following the usual practices of the journalism business was not liable for intrusion upon
seclusion because the public should expect a camera crew to film an accident scene and therefore
doing so was not highly offensive).
52. Shaun B. Spencer, Reasonable Expectations and the Erosionof Privacy, 39 SAN DIEGO L. REV.
843, 853 (2002).

53. See id. at 846.
54- Id.

55. JOSEPH TUROW ET. AL, AMERICANS REJECr TAILORED ADVERTISING AND THREE ACrIVmEs THAT
ENABLE IT (2009).
56. Id. at 3 (finding that sixty-six percent of those surveyed said they would not like websites to
display advertising targeted to their interests).
57. Id.
58. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 13, at 9-lo.
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or other dissemination of private information. It would be of little use,
however, in preventing the collection of the information itself or of the
accidental loss or theft of the information.
The tort can be broken down into four elements: (I) the information
must be given publicity, (2) the information must concern "the private
life of another," (3) its disclosure must be "highly offensive to a
reasonable person," and (4) the information must not be of "legitimate"
public concern." Just as with the intrusion tort, the disclosure tort has
serious limitations when dealing with information that is only somewhat
private. Much of the information in commercial databases might seem
private but when examined more closely is actually "public." A person's
address, phone number, age, hobbies, marital status, and so forth are all
in the public sphere and therefore are not "private" as defined by the
disclosure and seclusion torts. Similarly, the disclosure tort requires that
the disclosure be "highly offensive" to a reasonable person. This element
of the tort runs into problems similar to those encountered with the
intrusion tort.6o However, there are two problems with the disclosure tort
that are not present in the intrusion tort: one related to publicity and one
related to the First Amendment.
The first problem unique to this tort is the requirement that the
information be given publicity. While not specifically defined, it is a more
difficult standard for a plaintiff to meet than the "publication"
requirement in the area of defamation, which only requires that the
information be provided to a third person. Most likely, this tort is
limited to widespread dissemination of information to the public at large,
or at least to a number of individuals.6' The "publicity" requirement
would likely not be satisfied if the information never left the organization
that collected it or were shared with a few third parties. 6 3 However, the
requirement could possibly be met if the information were shared widely
enough through the sale 64 or was released to the public at large.
59. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977).

60. See supra Part LA, describing problems with the intrusion tort.
61. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (1977). This is in contrast to the tort of
defamation, which requires only "publication" of the matter "to one other than the person defamed."
Id. § 577(t).
62. Solove, supra note 49, at 1433 ("Although this tort could conceivably be applied to certain
uses of databases, such as the sale of personal information by the database industry, the tort of private
facts appears designed to redress excesses of the press, and is accordingly focused on the widespread
dissemination of personal information in ways that become known to the plaintiff.").
63. Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 288 (Idaho 1961) (holding that a bank
sharing a customer's private financial information with a third party did not satisfy the publicity
requirement).
64. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D cmt. a (977) ("[I1t is not an invasion of the right of
privacy, within the rule stated in this Section, to communicate a fact concerning the plaintiffs private
life to a single person or even to a small group of persons.").
65. A recent class action lawsuit filed in the Northern District of California against Netflix
illustrates the possible use of the public disclosure tort. See Complaint, Doe v. Netflix, Inc., (N.D. Cal.
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Pinning privacy hopes on the disclosure tort is problematic also
because of the tort's dubious constitutional standing.6 The Supreme
Court has allowed liability for the dissemination of truthful information
in only a limited number of circumstances.Y Erwin Chemerinsky notes
that in the areas of national securitya and the protection of publicity69 the
Court has allowed some liability.o However, these exceptions are
extremely rare:
[T]he reality is that there are very few cases in American history where
the Supreme Court in any context has allowed liability for truthful
speech. The First Amendment is based on the strong premise that
knowledge is better than ignorance, and liability for truthful speech is
inconsistent with that axiom."
Thus far, the Court has avoided ruling directly on whether the tort is in
fatal conflict with the First Amendment right to free speech." "Liability
for public disclosure of private facts should thus be limited to situations
in which publication will endanger public safety.""
In essence, the tort of public disclosure of private facts creates a tort
for "truthful defamation."" This is problematic because unlike defamation,
which allows for truth as a defense, the public disclosure tort makes a
person liable precisely because the information is true. This lack of a
truth defense has been struck down previously by the Supreme Court in
the area of criminal libel." Concerns about the tort's constitutionality
have lead the Supreme Court of North Carolina to refuse to adopt it in
Dec. 17, 2009) (Co9-05903), 2009 WL 6305245. The case arose when Netflix released seemingly
anonymous data about customer video rentals. The company released the data as part of a contest,
which asked contestants to try to design a system that would recommend movies to subscribers based
on the movies they had already watched and ranked. See Netflix Prize, NETFLIX,
http://www.netflixprize.com (last visited July 4, 2ol). Netflix was hoping that the contestants could
improve upon the company's own "Cinematch" system. Id. There were "5I,o51 contestants on 41,305
teams from 186 different countries ... participating in the contest and ... Netflix had received 44,o4
valid submissions from 5,169 different teams." Complaint, Doe v. Netflix, Inc., 2009 WL 6305245.
Researchers were able to use the data supplied by Netflix along with publicly available information to
attach names to movie rental histories. Id. In some cases, this information could be used to "out" gay
movie renters. Id. Along with several California and federal statutory claims, the plaintiffs alleged a
tortious public disclosure of private facts. Id. A second incarnation of the contest was canceled
because of privacy concerns. Steve Lohr, Netflix Cancels Contest After Concerns Are Raised About
Privacy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 13, 20o, at B3.
66. See Chemerinsky, supra note 32, at 424-26.

67. Id.
68. See Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
69. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad. Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
70. See Braun v. Soldier of Fortune Magazine, Inc., 968 F.2d 1110, 1122 (1ith Cir. 1992) (allowing
liability for advertising illegal activity, in this case an advertisement for a contract killer).
71. Chemerinsky, supra note 32, at 425.

72. See generally Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524 (1989); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S.
469 (1975)73. Chemerinsky, supra note 32, at 434.
74. Doe v. Methodist Hosp., 69o N.E.2d 681, 687 (Ind. 1997).
75. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 71-73 (1964).
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that state, 6 and several other states have refused to recognize it as a legal
cause of action." Even the Restatement (Second) of Torts includes a
note highlighting public disclosure's constitutionally dubious nature.
These problems make it unlikely that the disclosure tort will be of
much use to those hoping to contain the use of private information. The
requirement that the information be private, that its disclosure be highly
offensive, that there be "publicity," and the First Amendment issues all
show that there is little likelihood that this tort can be successfully used
against data traders.
C.

APPROPRIATION

The tort of appropriation holds the best hope for those who want to
use a traditional privacy tort to hold data collectors liable. On its face,
appropriation seems to provide a cause of action for the use of private
information. The Restatement (Second) of Torts assigns liability for
appropriation to "[o]ne who appropriates to his own use or benefit the
name or likeness of another."" The tort is often broken into three
elements: (I) an appropriation, (2) without consent, (3) "of one's name
or likeness for another's use or benefit."8 The most common way that a
person's likeness is appropriated is through the use of their name or
image to advertise a product or business "or for some other commercial
purpose." 8 ' The tort is not limited at common law to commercial uses,
although some states so restrict it by statute.' For there to be liability,
the defendant must "have appropriated to his own use or benefit the
reputation, prestige, social or commercial standing, public interest or
other values of the plaintiff's name or likeness."' The tort "does not
protect one's name per se; rather, it protects the value associated with
that name."8 4
There are two reasons that the appropriation tort might appear to
be the best tactic in creating liability for those who use and sell personal
information."' The first is that it seems to create liability for mental
distress and damages to the value of a person's identity." Second is the

76. Hall v. Post, 372 S.E.2d 711,714 (N.C. 1988).

77. See Methodist, 69o N.E.2d at 693; Stubbs v. N. Mem'1 Med. Ctr., 448 N.w.2d 78, 81 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1989); Hall, 372 S.E.2d at 714.
78. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D special note (1977).

79. Id. § 652C.
8o. Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1355 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995) (quoting RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C (977)).
81. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652C cmt. b (1977).
82. Id.
83. Id. at § 652C cmt. c.
84. Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d loo,
85. Ludington, supra note 30, at 169.

86. Id.

oo9 (N.H. 2003).
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breadth with which courts have defined "identity.",8 "Data traders deal
quite specifically in information that identifies a person, and the value of
the information is based on the accuracy and completeness with which
the person is identified."8 Because aggregation of information allows for
the identification of the person, it could be arued that combining
identifying information is enough to satisfy the tort.
However, courts have been extremely reluctant to allow the
appropriation tort to be used against data collectors and sellers.' In
Shibley," magazine publishers were sued for selling customer lists.9 2 The
Court of Appeals of Ohio held that this was not appropriation because
the tort is meant to prevent situations where the plaintiff's "name or
likeness is displayed to the public to indicate that the plaintiff indorses
the defendant's product or business."" Because the companies' activities
did not involve this kind of behavior, the appropriation tort was held to
be inapplicable.'
The court in Remsburg v. Docusearch, Inc. used a different
justification for not applying the appropriation tort to the sale of
personal information." In Remsburg, an Internet-based investigation
service was sued after it sold information to a woman's stalker." Using
the information supplied by Docusearch, the stalker was able to shoot
and kill the woman outside her workplace.97 The administratrix of the
woman's estate sued, arguing that the company was liable for
appropriation after it sold the information to the stalker.8 The Supreme
Court of New Hampshire held that there was no liability for
appropriation of likeness because the information's value did not stem
from the woman's reputation or prestige. Instead, the information was
independently valuable:"

87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. See Nelson v. Harrah's Entm't Inc., 2oo8 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 46524, at *3-4 (N.D. Ill. June

13,

2oo8); Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1353 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); Remsburg v.

Docusearch, Inc., 816 A.2d loor, iolo (N.H. 2003) ("An investigator who sells personal information
sells the information for the value of the information itself, not to take advantage of the person's
reputation or prestige.").
91. 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ohio Ct. App. 1975).

Id. at 338.
93. Id. at 339 (citing WILLIAM PROSSER,
92.

94. Id. at 340.

95. 816 A.2d at loo5-o6.
96. Id.
97. Id.

98. Id. at loo9.

99. Id. at soio.

LAW OF TORTS § 17

(4th ed.

197)).
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The investigator does not capitalize upon the goodwill value associated
with the information but rather upon the client's willingness to pay for
the information. In other words, the benefit derived from the sale in no
way relates to the social or commercial standing of the person whose
information is sold.'
Because of this distinction in value, the court held there was no cause of
action against a person who sells the personal information of another.'o'
The holding in Remsburg is similar to that in Dwyer," in which
American Express cardholders sued the company for selling their
purchasing information to third parties." The Appellate Court of Illinois
held that there was little or no value in an individual's name: "[A] single,
random cardholder's name has little or no intrinsic value to
defendants."" Instead, the information's value came from the
defendants' "categorizing and aggregating" of the plaintiffs' names.o"
And the defendants' actions did not "deprive any of the cardholders of
any value their individual names may possess.""' Therefore, the plaintiffs
failed to properly allege a tortious misappropriation.'"
As Sarah Ludington notes, no data trader has ever been found liable
for misappropriation,"' and with the restraints courts have put on the
tort, it seems unlikely that one ever will be. The tort of misappropriation
is simply not a good fit for data collection, use, and sale. As the
oo. Id.

io.

Id. But see Ludington, supra note 3o, at 170-71 (arguing that dicta in Remsburg could allow a
suit to be brought when the data is sold for the value of the individual's "'social or commercial
standing'-their spending habits, preferences, interests, or creditworthiness").
102. Dwyer v. Am. Express Co., 652 N.E.2d 1351, 1354 (Ill. App. Ct. 1995); see supra Part L.A for
discussion of this case in relation to the intrusion tort.
103. Dwyer, 652 N.E.2d at 1353.
104. Id. at 1356.
io5. Id.

io6. Id.
107. See In re Trans Union Corp. Privacy Litig., 326 F. Supp. 2d 893, 903 (N.D. Ill. 2004) (citing
Dwyer positively and holding that plaintiffs must allege that "a specific reputation, prestige or social
standing" was appropriated by the defendant). For an example of a court willing to use a broader
definition of appropriation, see Weld v. CVS Pharmacy, Inc., No. CIV. A. 98-o897F, 1999 WL 494114,
at *8 (Mass. Super. Ct. June 29, 1999); Ludington, supra note 3o, at 171. In Weld, a pharmacy compiled
a list of persons who were filling prescriptions for medication for certain illnesses. Weld, 1999 WL
494114, at *i. It sold that list to pharmaceutical companies, which then sent out brochures. Id. The
Massachusetts Superior Court denied the defendant's motion for summary judgment and held that
commercial use of the information was not needed because appropriation "also applies when the
defendant makes use of the plaintiffs name or likeness for his own purposes and benefit, even though
the use is not a commercial one, and even though the benefit sought to be obtained is not a pecuniary
one." Id. at *6 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 652B cmt. B (1977)). However, after the trial
concluded, the court reexamined the case and held that there was no appropriation. Kelley v. CVS
Pharmacy, Inc., No. 98-o897-BLS2, 2007 WL 2781163, at *6 (Mass. Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2007). In that
second case, the same court held that the state statute controlling appropriation allowed claims only
when the defendant seeks to "take advantage" of the plaintiff's "reputation, prestige, or other value
associated with him, for purposes of publicity." Id. at *6 (quoting MAsS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 214,
§ 3A).
io8. Ludington, supra note 3o, at 171.
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illustrations that accompany the Restatement (Second) of Torts indicate,
appropriation was designed for a different sort of harm. It was designed
to protect a person's image and name in public advertising, and has
proven to be ill-suited to the field of data aggregation.'"
All of the privacy torts suffer from the same problem with their
design: they were conceived to prevent the harms of another era. Even if
these individual problems could be fixed, the common law privacy
regime, as it has been developed in the United States, likely would not be
of much use in preventing the collection of small bits of information that
are combined into something more intrusive than any of its parts:"o
By its nature, tort law looks to isolated acts, to particular infringements
and wrongs. The problem with databases does not stem from any
specific act, but is a systemic issue of power caused by the aggregation
of relatively small actions, each of which when viewed in isolation
would appear quite innocuous."'
Unlike a naked picture in a magazine, a Peeping Tom, or a video used
for commercial purposes, the individual bits of information collected
from Internet users are unlikely to raise strong concerns. It is entirely
possible that the person whose privacy has been "invaded" would never
even know that an "intrusion" has taken place."' Thus, the traditional
privacy torts are ill suited to solving the data collection problem.
II. BREACH OF CONFIDENTIALITY
Because of the limitations of the traditional privacy torts, academics
have attempted to expand the use of other torts to provide recovery for
plaintiffs against data traders."3 One of the more interesting is the notion
of reviving the rarely used tort of breach of confidentiality." 4 Instead of
protecting one's right to be "let alone," breach of confidentiality focuses
on relationships rather than on the intrusion or the data itself."' While
the United States was establishing its privacy common law around the
ideas expressed by Warren and Brandeis"' and codified by Prosser, the
English were using confidentiality as a way to protect privacy rights."'
io9.

See RESTATEMENT

(SECOND) OF TORTs

§ 652C

cmt.

a

(1977).

n1o. See Solove, supra note 49, at 1434.
iii.
Id.
112. Id.
113. See G. Michael Harvey, Comment, Confidentiality: A Measured Response to the Failure of
Privacy, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 2385, 2425 (1992).

114. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards & Daniel J. Solove, Privacy's Other Path: Recovering the Law of
Confidentiality, 96 GEO. L.J. 123 (2oo'7); see also generally Susan M. Gilles, Promises Betrayed: Breach
of Confidence as a Remedy for Invasions of Privacy, 43 BuFF. L. REV. I (1995); Stephanie D. Taylor,
Small Hope Floats?: How the Lower Courts Have Sunk the Right of Privacy, io8 W. VA. L. REV. 459
(2oo5); Harvey, supra note I3; Alan B. Vickery, Note, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort,
82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426 (1982).
115. Richards & Solove, supra note 114, at 125.

16. Ironically, Warren and Brandeis explicitly rejected using breach of confidence as a way to
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A plaintiff can establish a breach by showing that there was a duty
of confidentiality and then a breach of that duty." "Courts have found
the existence of such a duty by looking to the nature of the relationship
between the parties, by reference to the law of fiduciaries, or by finding
an implied contract of confidentiality.""
Most breaches of
confidentiality have been found in cases against doctors, but courts have
also applied it to banks, hospitals, insurance companies, psychiatrists,
social workers, accountants, school officials, attorneys, and employees. 2 o
However, the most "clearly established" use of the tort involves physicians
and banks."'
English courts hold that a duty of confidence can be created "by
contract, the pre-existing relations of the parties, or the unilateral
imposition of such a duty by the confider telling the confidant that the

protect privacy rights. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 20, at 210-II. They argued that betrayal of a
confidence is too narrow to justify finding a breach: "[N]ow that modern devices afford abundant
opportunities for the perpetration of such wrongs without any participation by the injured party, the
protection granted by the law must be placed upon a broader foundation." Id. at 2H1.
II7. Richards & Solove, supra note I4, at 158-59; see also Coco v. A.N. Clark (Eng'rs) Ltd.,
[1968] F.S.R. 415, 419 (Eng.). Coco held that there are three elements in a cause of action for breach of
confidence: "First, the information itself ... must have the necessary quality of confidence about it.
Secondly, that information must have been imparted in circumstances importing an obligation of
confidence. Thirdly, there must be an unauthorised use of that information to the detriment of the
party communicating it." Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). For a modern
application of the law, see A v. B plc., [2oo2] EWCA (Civ) 337, [2003] Q.B- 195, 195 (Eng.) (finding no
breach of confidence in the publishing of details of a footballer's affairs). See generally Basil
Markesinis et al., Concerns and Ideas About the Developing English Law of Privacy (And How
Knowledge of Foreign Law Might Be of Help), 52 AM. J. Com. L. 133 (2004) (summarizing the

development of privacy law in England).
118. Richards & Solove, supra note 14, at 157.
119. Id.

120. Id. at 157-58 (citing Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 516 (4th Cir.
1999) ("The tort [of breach of duty of loyalty] applies when the employee breaches her employer's
confidences")); Ingram v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 170 F. Supp. 2d 907, 911 (W.D. Mo. 2001) (holding
that an insurance company has a duty no different from that of a doctor or hospital to protect the
private medical information it receives); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 367 P.2d 284, 290 (Idaho
1961) (holding that the special relationship between a bank and its customer creates a duty to protect
the customer's confidential information); Saur v. Probes, 476 N.W.2d 496, 498 (Mich. Ct. App. 1991)
("[A] legal duty does exist on the part of a psychiatrist not to disclose privileged communications.");
Rich v. N.Y. Cent. & Hudson River R.R. Co., 87 N.Y. 382, 390 (1882) (holding that a duty separate
from a contractual obligation exists between a lawyer and his client); Harley v. Druzba, 169 A.D.2d
1001, 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) ("[T]he communications to be fostered in the social worker/client
relationship are confidential and that plaintiff is entitled to invoke the privilege of professional
confidence...."); Blair v. Union Free Sch. Dist. No. 6, 324 N.Y.S.2d 222, 228 (N.Y. Dist. Ct. 1971)
(holding that a school owes a duty of confidentiality to students and their families); Biddle v. Warren
Gen. Hosp., 715 N.E.2d 518, 523 (Ohio 1999) (holding that there is an independent tort for breach of
confidence for the "unprivileged disclosure to a third party of nonpublic medical information that a
physician or hospital has learned within a physician-patient relationship"); Wagenheim v. Alexander
Grant & Co., 482 N.E.2d 955, 961 (Ohio Ct. App. 1983) (holding that an accountant has a duty not to
reveal private information about his clients);.
121. Vickery, supra note 114, at 1428.
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information is given in confidence."'. In some circumstances, English
courts will impose a duty on a third party receiving the information as
long as the party knows the information was given in confidence."' They
also have applied the duty to a wide range of personal relationships,
including spouses and close friends." 4American courts, however, have
limited the duty to close professional relationships, when they have
found a duty at all."'
Breach of confidence in English law has its "roots in contract and
fiduciary law" but is, in fact, a tort."' American courts have only
recognized a cause of action under circumstances that have their roots in
the law of contracts or fiduciary duties."' However, there has been a call
for a separate tort of breach of confidence that would rid itself of the
technical requirements of both contract law and fiduciary duties."' The
way in which a court arrives at a breach of confidence cause of action
matters, whether it be through contract law or through a fiduciary duty.
Thus, this Note addresses each of these theories in turn.
A

THE CONTRACT THEORY

There are two basic ways in which a duty of confidence can be
established under a contract theory. The first is that of an express
contract, in which one party agrees to divulge information on the
condition that it remain secret. The most explicit of these agreements is
not controversial."' Explicit contracts that limit the ability of the speaker
122. Gilles, supra note I4, at io (quoting Marcel v. Comm'r of Police, [1992] I All E.R. 72)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
123. Id. at 12.
124. Gilles, supranote 114, at

13 n.64

(citing Duchess of Argyll v. Duke of Argyll, [1967] 1 Ch. 302,

329 (Eng.) ("[The] policy of the law, so far from indicating that communication between husband and
wife should be excluded from protection against breaches of confidence ... strongly favours its
inclusion." (internal citation omitted)); see also Stephens v. Avery, [1988] I Ch. 449, 456 (Eng.)
(holding that the duty of confidence extends to friends when the information is given to the friend on
the condition that it remain confidential).
125. American courts have held third parties to a breach liable in some circumstances. See, e.g.,
Hammonds v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 243 F. Supp. 793, 803 (N.D. Ohio 1965) ("[Plarticipation in
breaches of trust must also apply to one who participates in or induces the breach of any fiduciary
duty.").
126. Gilles, supra note 114, at 14.
127. Id. at 14-15.

128. A small number of jurisdictions recognize a separate, limited tort of breach of confidence.
See, e.g., Faris v. Enberg, 158 Cal. Rptr- 704,712 (Ct. App. 1979) ("An actionable breach of confidence
will arise when an idea, whether or not protectable, is offered to another in confidence, and is
voluntarily received by the offeree in confidence with the understanding that it is not to be disclosed to
others, and is not to be used by the offeree for purposes beyond the limits of the confidence without
the offeror's permission."); Harley v. Druzba, 169 A.D.2d tool, 1002 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991) (holding
that breach of confidence was a tort separate from a breach of contract cause of action). However,
both New York and California "use contractual and fiduciary concepts to define the tort." Gilles,
supra note I14, at 53.

129. Gilles, supra note 114, at 15 ("Express written contracts, binding the signer to hold
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are quite common in the area of employment.13o The second way to
establish a duty of confidence is through a sort of implied contract that is
often close to fiduciary duty. 3 ' These implied contracts arise from the
relationship between the contracting parties and are enforced "only
when it is within the actual expectation of the parties." 32 When the
relationship involves "lawyers and other professional care-givers," an
implicit expectation of privacy comes with the contract for services.' 33
However, the further the relationship gets from these special
relationships, the less likely it is that confidentiality will be implied by the
courts."
There are two major problems with basing a breach of confidence
claim on a contract theory. First, there is the issue of meeting the
technical requirements of a contract claim. 13 There must be
consideration,36 which might be difficult to show in a situation where
information is given to a company while surfing the Internet or making a
purchase. The plaintiff might be required to show that she received
something in return for the forfeiture of information. The plaintiff would
also be required to show that the parties intended to make a contract. 37
Again, it would be difficult to show that the person who reveals
information to a data collecting company intended to enter into a
contract with that company. Second, the plaintiff might be required to
show that the contract's terms were "reasonably certain."3. If there is no
written contract, it is difficult to show exactly what the person expected
would happen with their information and what the legally binding
obligations were for the data collecting company.'3
But even if these technical problems can be solved, the problem of
damages remains.'4 0 Contract law is ill-suited to recovery for damages
associated with loss of reputation and mental distress. 4 ' Unfortunately
for a plaintiff looking to sue a data-collecting company for using or
selling her personal information, it is likely that these are her only real

information confidential, have long been used in the commercial area... .").
130. See 2 RUDOLPH CALLMANN, UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS AND MONOPOLIES § 14:6 (2010)
(explaining that employment contracts can extend the obligation to protect information that might not
otherwise be covered by trade secrets laws and can remain in effect after the employee leaves the job).
131. See Food Lion, Inc. v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 194 F.3d 505, 515 (4th Cir.

1999)

(holding that

the employment contract can create an implied duty of confidence).
132.
133.
134.
135.

Gilles, supra note 114, at 18.
Id. at 19.
Id.

136.

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS

Id. at 19-25.

§ 71 (1981).

137. See id. § 17
138. Id. § 33.

139. The Statute of Frauds could also present a problem with unwritten contracts. See id. § Iro.
140. Gilles, supra note 114, at 25-32.
141. Id. at 25-26.
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damages. Also unavailable are punitive damages,'42 the only real
remaining avenue for recovery.
One possible solution to the technical requirements of recovery
under a contract theory is that of promissory estoppel.'" This doctrine
allows recovery even when the technical requirements of contract law are
not met.'" However, there still must have been a promise to keep the
data private, and the person seeking recovery must show that she
reasonably relied on that promise and changed her position as a result.'45
There is also the requirement that the court find that enforcing the
promise will avoid "injustice.', 6
These are all high hurdles for the typical plaintiff seeking recovery
for the use and sale of her personal information. Showing a promise
would be difficult, although possible, considering most companies that
collect personal information maintain a privacy policy. 47 However, even
if a plaintiff could show a promise, she would have to show that she
relied on it and then, because promissory estoppel is an equitable
remedy, the court would have to hold that enforcing the promise would
prevent injustice. And even if all of these elements could be met, the
plaintiff would still have the same problem with limited damages.
B.

THE FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP THEORY

Instead of using contract law to establish a duty for the breach of
confidence, some courts look to fiduciary duties to establish the requisite
relationship. The Restatement (Second) of Torts provides that "[o]ne
standing in a fiduciary relation with another is subject to liability to the
other for harm resulting from a breach of duty imposed by the
relation." 1 A duty to keep private information confidential can be
established using fiduciary duties. 49 This theory looks to the essence of
the relationship, rather than to any agreement reached by the parties.
Under traditional fiduciary law those in certain relationships are bound
by the duty, including trustees, personal representatives of estates,
guardians or conservators, partners in partnerships, joint venturers,
agents and principals, co-owners, and attorneys.'o But fiduciary

142. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 355 (198i). But see generally William S. Dodge, The
Case for Punitive Damages in Contracts, 48 DUKE L.J. 629 (1999).
143. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981).
144. Id.
145. See id.

146. Id.
147. At least one state actually requires businesses that collect information from their customers

on the Internet to have a privacy policy. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22575(a) (2010).

§ 874 (979).
149. See Gilles, supra note 114, at 39-40.
50. CARYL A. YZENBAARD ET AL., THE LAW OF TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES
148. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS

§ 481 ( 3 d ed. 2009).
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relationships are not limited to those listed and can arise as the facts and
circumstances demand."'
The law of confidentiality, however, is more expansive than the
traditional fiduciary duties.'
A confidential relation exists between two persons when one has
gained the confidence of the other and purports to act or advise with
the other's interest in mind. A confidential relation may exist although
there is no fiduciary relation; it is particularly likely to exist where
there is a family relationship or one of friendship or such a relation of
confidence as that which arises between physician and patient or priest
and penitent.'
Sometimes the terms "fiduciary" and "confidential" will be used
interchangeably.S4 But the term "confidential relation" is used "when the
relationship is similar to those noted in a fiduciary relation but does not
fit into one of the well-defined categories of fiduciary law."' It is an
equitable concept that lacks a concrete definition. However, cases in
which confidential relationships have been found tend to emphasize
"great intimacy, disclosure of secrets, entrustment of power, and
superiority of position.""'
The relationship between the person giving up her information and
the company collecting it simply does not meet the required criteria.
There is no "great intimacy" nor is there any "entrustment of power."
The superiority of position is questionable when a consumer has many
ways of buying a product or service, is simply ignorant of the privacy
considerations, or doesn't really care whether the company collects
information about her. Even the depth of the secrets divulged is
questionable. Most of the personally identifying information is not
terribly personal until it is combined with other information by
companies that aggregate information. While medical records or detailed
financial information might meet the secrecy requirement, a person's
name, address, and list of hobbies likely will not.

151. Id.

Courts asked to find a fiduciary relationship in a new context will first identify a relationship
that the law already recognizes as having fiduciary status. Using that relationship as a model
for analyzing the relationship at issue, the courts will next evaluate whether the instant
relationship is sufficiently like the model relationship to support recognizing it as fiduciary.
Marcey L. Grigsby, Book Review, Seeking Privacy: Examining a Role for the Fiduciary in Protecting
PersonalInformation, 5o N.Y.L. ScH. L. REV. Io31, 1051-52 (2005) (reviewing DANIEL J. SOLOVE, THE
DIGITAL PERSON: TECHNOLOGY AND PRIVACY IN THE INFORMATION AGE (2004)).
152. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TRUSTS

§ 2 cmt.

b (1973).

153. Id.
154. YZENBAARD ET AL., supra note 150, § 482.
155. Id.

156. Id.; see also Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507, 510-I (1980) (per curiam) (holding that a
former CIA employee breached an obligation to the CIA by publishing information he learned during
his employment without first submitting the information to the agency).
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Solove proposes that fiduciary relationships be expanded to include
those businesses that hold personal information.' He bemoans the fact
that the relationship between collectors and users of personal data "is
akin to the relationship between strangers-with one very important
difference: One of the strangers knows a lot about the other and often
has the power to use this information to affect the other's life.""' Solove
concedes that his proposal is a "radical" one and admits that courts have
thus far been unwilling to extend fiduciary duties so far.'59 He argues that
fiduciary law is flexible enough to impose a duty on companies that hold
personal information.'
However, expanding the duty of confidence to embrace more
relationships has its drawbacks. 6' First, there is the issue of where to
draw the line. It seems highly problematic to impose fiduciary duties in
arms-length commercial transactions and web searches. It is wellestablished law that buyers and sellers have no fiduciary duties to each
other.'6 , Second, even if one party places "trust or confidence in the
other," an arms-length transaction does not create a fiduciary duty
absent "some recognition, acceptance or undertaking of the duties of a
fiduciary on the part of the other party."' To say simply that anyone
who possesses private information owes a duty of confidence to the
person to whom the data relates, without some strong limiting principle,
would create unending liability: "In our lives as social beings we are
forced to rely on librarians, police officers, bank tellers, telephone
operators and many more. Do every one of these relations qualify as
confidential?"' 64 And imposing a duty on those with whom a person
conducts business in no way controls those who collect personal
information outside of the buyer-seller relationship.
As with establishing a duty under contract law, establishing a duty
of confidence under fiduciary law provides the plaintiff with limited
damages. 6 5 Restitutionary damages are possible in the form of
157. SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 103.

158. Id. at

102.

159. Id. at 103.
i6o. Id. at 103-04.

161. See Gilles, supra note 114, at 46-48; see also Grigsby,supra note 151, at 1053-55.
162. Nifty Foods Corp. v. Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co., 614 F.2d 832, 838 (2d Cir. 1980) ("The
relationship of a buyer to his supplier, even if that buyer accounts for the large part of the supplier's
business, does not constitute a fiduciary or other special relationship of trust .... ), superseded by
statuteas recognized in Rosenfeld v. Basquiat, 78 F-3 d 84 (2d Cir. 1996); see also Alexander v. CIGNA
Corp., 991 F. Supp. 427, 438 (D.N.J. 1998) ("[F]iduciary duties are not imposed in ordinary
commercial business transactions."); Paul v. North, 380 P.2d 421, 426 (Kan. 1963) ("[A fiduciary
relationship exists in business transactions only] when, by their concerted action, they willingly and
knowingly act for one another in a manner to impose mutual trust and confidence that a fiduciary
relationship arises.").
163. Lanz v. Resolution Trust Corp., 764 F. Supp. 176, 179 (S.D. Fla. 1991).
164. Gilles, supra note 114, at 46-47.
165. See id. at 48-51-
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"disgorgement of any monetary gain by the fiduciary or the imposition of
a constructive trust."'" Damages are evaluated by looking at the gain to
the defendant rather than at the loss to the plaintiff,'6 something that can
be extremely difficult to measure. However, it is probable that, like a
cause of action under contract law, the plaintiff will not be able to
recover for emotional distress. The recovery for any one plaintiff would
probably be very little, because the measure of profit by the company in
retaining and selling the information of one individual is likely to be
small.'6

C.

CREATING A TORT

At least two states, New York and California, have created a
separate tort of breach of confidence, which exists outside of fiduciary
duties and contract law. Both states, however, continue to rely on
fiduciary duties and contract law to define the scope of the tort.
California relies heavily on contract law to define the tort's scope and
confines it to cases where the parties have knowledge that confidence is
required.'o This reliance on contract law likely springs from the fact that
most breach of confidence cases in California concern "the revelation of
an idea for a show or movie.""' New York, however, bases the scope of
the tort on either fiduciary relationships or implied contract. 2
The benefit of creating a tort separate from fiduciary duties and
contract law is twofold. First, damages are not as restricted in a tort
action as they are under a fiduciary or contract cause of action. Second,
the technical requirements of both contract and fiduciary law can be
largely ignored. However, one large practical problem that plagues both
contractual and fiduciary causes of action remains, even if the cause of
action is defined as one in tort law. Knowing which relationships are
covered by the tort is difficult, as there will still be the need to attach
liability in arms-length transactions. Simply defining the action as a tort
still requires the court to decide if the relationship is one that should be
covered by the tort, whether the relationship springs from a contract-like
duty or is established without the need for the parties to agree that the
information remain confidential.
166. Id. at 48.
167. Taylor, supra note I14, at 491.

168. See Kohler v. Fletcher, 442 N.W.2d 169, 172 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989); Lash v. Cheshire Cnty.
Say. Bank, Inc., 474 A.2d 980, 982 (N.H. 1984) (per curiam); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND)

OF

TRUSTS § 197 (1973) ("Except as stated in § 198, the remedies of the beneficiary against the trustee are
exclusively equitable.").

169. A class action lawsuit might solve this problem, but examination of this idea is beyond the
scope of this Note.
170. See Faris v. Enberg, 158 Cal. Rptr. 704,713 (Ct. App. 1979).
171. Gilles, supra note 114, at 54.
172. Id.
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III. INFORMATION AS A PROPERTY RIGHT
Another method for protecting against data trading would be to
establish a property right in private information.'73 Scholars have
proposed creating this right in response to the problems associated with
trying to protect those privacy rights through torts.'74 This response is
understandable, considering the limits that tort and contract law impose
for those trying to keep personal information from being collected, sold,
or stolen. But there is a fundamental flaw in the use of property rights to
protect the private information of individuals."' At its core, granting a
property right to information is essentially creating a property right in
facts:
Our society has a longstanding commitment to freedom of expression.
Property rights in any sort of information raise significant policy and
free speech issues. Facts are basic building blocks: building blocks of
expression; of self-government; and of knowledge itself. When we
recognize property rights in facts, we endorse the idea that facts may
be privately owned and that the owner of a fact is entitled to restrict
the uses to which that fact may be put. That notion is radical."'
The Supreme Court has considered and rejected the notion that one can
create a property right in facts and keep others from using those facts."'
In Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enterprises, the Court held
that copyright law is constitutional but included an important caveat: The
First Amendment does not allow an author to copyright his ideas or
facts.' , "[A]ll facts-scientific, historical, biographical, and news of the
173. See, e.g., Lawrence Lessig, The Architecture of Privacy, i VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 56, 63
(1999); see also Vera Bergelson, It's Personal but Is It Mine? Toward Property Rights in Personal
Information, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 379,383 (2oo3).
174. Bergelson, supra note 173, at 414. Bergelson argues there are three reasons that a propertybased solution is superior to a tort-based solution: "(i) the torts approach cannot support a consistent,
workable mechanism for the enforcement of information privacy rights; (ii) U.S. law, explicitly or
implicitly, already regards personal information as property; and (iii) the property regime better serves
the interests of individual parties and society in general." Id.
175. Scholars have come up with other reasons to be skeptical of creating a property right in one's
own property. Those include a market-based argument, which argues that, rather than constrain data
trading, creating a property right in personal facts will create a more robust market in private
information than currently exists. See Jessica Litman, Information Privacy/Information Property,
52 STAN. L. REV. 1283, 1295-96 (2ooo). These criticisms are beyond the scope of this Note.
176. Id. at 1294.

177. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information Privacy: The Troubling Implications
of a Right to Stop Peoplefrom Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1049, 1o65-68 (2ooo).
178. 471 U.S. 539, 556 (1985). ("[Cjopyright's idealexpression dichotomy 'strike[s] a definitional
balance between the First Amendment and the Copyright Act by permitting free communication of
facts while still protecting an author's expression."' (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enters., 723 F.2d 195, 203 (2d Cir. 1983))). The idea that there is no property right in facts is not new.
See Int'l News Serv. v. Assoc. Press, 248 U.S. 215, 246 (1918) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[T]here is no
property in the combination or in the thoughts or facts that the words express. Property, a creation of
law, does not arise from value, although exchangeable-a matter of fact."); see also U.S. News &
World Report, Inc. v. Avrahami, No.95-1318, 1996 Va. Cir. LEXIS 598, at *16 (Va. Cir. June 13, 1996)
(holding that there is no property right in a name).
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day... may not be copyrighted and are part of the public domain
available to every person."' Similarly, trademark law does not extend
the right to exclude others from the use of opinions and facts, "even if
the speech uses the product's name."'
The prohibition on creating a property right in facts is
understandable. It is difficult to see how one would define what is
covered by the property right. Is it the combining together of facts
together that forms a right to privacy? Would the law have to create safe
havens of fair use for noncommercial use of this private information?
How would this property right be enforced when private information
such as names, addresses, credit card numbers, and other financial and
consumer information is required to conduct a vast amount of business
both in person and on the Internet?
All of these questions point to the ultimate reason that property,
tort, and contract law are the wrong solution to the problem. Counting
on judge-made common law to regulate such a fast moving and invasive
problem is simply inadequate. Even if courts could find a way to avoid
the problems with privacy torts, breach of confidence, and property law,
it would be a slow and inconsistent process that would allow the problem
to fester for many years before a solution could be found. That is why
this Note advocates a statutory or regulatory solution to the problem.
State legislatures and Congress, either on its own or through power
delegated to the FTC, have the ability to craft flexible, responsive
solutions that carefully target the problem without creating First
Amendment conflicts.

IV.

THE CURRENT STATE OF STATUTORY AND REGULATORY LAW

The laws governing the use of private information in private
commercial databases have been roundly criticized. The statutory and
regulatory scheme has been called inconsistent, unpredictable, and
haphazard. 8' But the latest indications are that states and the federal
government have begun to take concerns over databases of personal
information seriously. David Vladeck, the head of the Bureau of
Consumer Protection at the FTC, said his agency is planning on getting
tougher with companies that collect personal information from
customers on the Internet,' and the FTC has proposed a so-called "No
179. Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 348 (1991) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
18o. Volokh, supra note 177, at 1o67. The other main area of intellectual property is patent law,
but its application to this problem is inappropriate as patent law deals with inventions and processes,
not pieces of information. See 35 U.S.C. § 10 (2006).
181. Ludington, supra note 30, at 151-

182. Stephanie Clifford, Fresh Views at Agency Overseeing Online Ads, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 20o9,
at Bi; see also Thomas Claburn, FTC Examining Cloud Computing, INFORMATIONWEEK (Jan. 5, 2010),

http://www.informationweek.com/news/government/policy/22220o38o;

John

Letzing,

FTC

Has

SOMEONE IS WATCHING

July 20II]

1817

Track List" to protect Internet users. 83 And, at least when it comes to
protecting consumers from identity theft, there has been a lot of action
on the part of both state and local government in recent years.

A.

FEDERAL LAW

Congress has passed several laws that directly affect those who
collect and use private information. The vast majority of these laws can
be divided into two categories. First, there are privacy laws that cover
financial institutions. These laws cover everything from the right to
inspect records to the ability to share information. The second category is
more of a mishmash. These laws target specific kinds of information
deemed to be so private as to deserve special protection. Congress has
stepped in to create statutory protection for medical information and
media consumption habits. Some of these laws create severe restrictions
on any dissemination, some try to create protection for victims of identity
theft, and still others limit the ability to collect the information in the first
place.
i.

FinancialInformation

With the dawn of the computer age came attempts by Congress to
address the privacy concerns revolving around the large amount of
financial information beginning to accumulate in private databases."' In
1970, Congress passed the Fair Credit Reporting Act (FCRA),"' which
attempted to ensure "[a]ccuracy and fairness" in the credit-reporting
system by giving people the right to inspect their credit records and
correct any mistakes in them, as well as limiting the use and disclosure of
information to third parties. 86
Decades later, Congress passed the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act.'
This Act glaces significant restrictions on the ability of financial
institutions

to share their customers' nonpublic personal information'8

"Particular Interest" in Facebook Privacy, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 19, 20io), http://www.marketwatch.com/

story/ftc-has-particular-interest-in-facebook-privacy-2olo-ox-19.
183. See infra PartV.E.i.
184. See CHRISTOPHER WOLF, PROSKAUER ON PRIVACY: A GUIDE TO PRIVACY AND DATA SECURITY

LAW IN THE INFORMATION AGE § 2:1.1 (Ist ed. 2007).

185. 15 U.S.C. H§168i-i68iu (2oo6).
186. Id. However, FRCA's reach is limited to "consumer reporting agenc[ies]." 15 U.S.C.
§ 168ia(f) (2oo6). The definition of a consumer reporting agency extends beyond the three major
reporting agencies-Equifax, Experian, and Trans Union-but is still limited by the definition
contained in FRCA. See WOLF, supra note 184, § 2:2.2[C].
187. 15 U.S.C. H§68o1-68o9 (2oo6). Gramm-Leach-Bliley is also known as the Financial Services
Modernization Act of 1999. BROWNLEE & WALESKI, supra note 188, § I.o5[4], at 1-59.
188. A "financial institution" is defined as "any institution the business of which is engaging in
financial activities as described in section 1843(k) of title 12." Id. § 68o9(3)(A). See CHARLENE BROWNLEE
& BLAZE D. WALESKI, PRIVACY LAW § 3.03[I] (2oo) for a full description of the wide range of
businesses covered by the law. The complex and broad language of the statute means that many
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with "nonaffiliated third part[ies]."'" It requires financial institutions
who wish to share their customers' nonpublic personal information to
notify their customers once a year about what information is collected
and how it is used."' It also requires that the customer have the ability to
opt out.'"9
Congress has also responded in recent years to the threats posed by
identity theft. In 2003, Congress amended the FCRA by passing the Fair
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act.'" This Act gives victims of
identity theft the ability to put an alert on their credit report'94 and block
information resulting from identity theft.'95 It now also requires that
merchants truncate debit and credit card numbers and remove expiration
dates on sales slips.'9
Information-SpecificStatutes
In addition to laws that protect financial information, Congress has
passed a series of laws that protect specific kinds of information. The
Video Privacy Protection Act'" is a statute that bans a "video tape
service provider" from knowingly providing "identifiable information"
about a customer to anyone.9' The statute essentially bans movie rental
and sales companies from sharing a customer's rental or sales
information. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act
includes provisions forbidding the dissemination of health care
2.

institutions that do not consider themselves financial institutions might be covered by the Act. See
KENNEDY, supra note 5, § 3.1.1, at 57. "Some travel agencies, for example, appear to be within the
definition, as are retailers that offer their own installment payment accounts." Id.
189. Nonpublic personal information "means personally identifiable financial information-(i)
provided by a consumer to a financial institution; (ii) resulting from any transaction with the consumer
or any service performed for the consumer; or (iii) otherwise obtained by the financial institution. 15
U.S.C. § 68o9(4)(A).
190. Id. § 6802(a).
191. KENNEDY, supra note 5, § 3.1.2.
192. Id. Gramm-Leach-Bliley creates a complex web of regulation, tasking members of eight
different agencies with implementing regulations: the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, the Board of Directors of the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation, the Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision, the Board of the National
Credit Union Administration, the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the FTC. Id. § 3.1.. In
addition to the federal agencies tasked with enforcement of the Act, state insurance regulators govern
those "engaged in providing insurance." Id. However, the differences in regulations of the agencies
only varies slightly. Id.; see also Kathleen A. Hardee, The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act: Five Years After
Implementation, Does the Emperor Wear Clothes?, 39 CREIGHTON L. REV. 915, 936-37 (2oo6)
(suggesting that the Act's accomplishments have been limited).
193. Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-159,
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 10, 15, and 31 U.S.C.).

194. 15 U.S.C. § 168ic-i (2oo6).
195. Id. § 1681c-2.
196. Id. § 168sc(g).
197. 18 U.S.C. § 2710 (2oo6).
198. Id. § 271o(b)(I).

III Stat.

1952
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information.'" Congress also has restricted the use and disclosure of
Social Security numbers2 o and the dissemination of school records.o' The
Cable Communications Policy Act.2 protects cable subscriber information
by requiring cable companies to give notice of what information they are
collecting and how it is being used.'" This Act also prohibits cable
companies from collecting personally identifiable information using the
cable system or disclosing such information without the prior consent of
the customer.'" Similarly, the Telecommunications Act protects against
the disclosure of individually identifiable subscriber data by a
telecommunications carrier without prior approval.o"
3. Other FederalLaws
Congress has not limited itself to the protection of particular kinds
of information or information being held by particular kinds of
organizations. For instance, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1996
prohibits unauthorized access to a computer to access protected data. 6
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, while chiefly known for reforming corporate
governance, requires public companies to maintain adequate "internal
controls" on information.'" This language has been construed to cover
the protection of private information held by the companies.
"Presumably, 'internal controls' cannot be achieved without adequate
data protection mechanisms for financial information."
Congress has also moved to protect at least one particular class of
individuals from data collection. The Children's Online Privacy
Protection Act provides special protection for those under the age of
thirteen.2" The Act requires that any commercial website that is directed
at children under the age of thirteen get verifiable parental consent

199. See Pub. L. No. io4-191, ito Stat. 1936 (1996) (codified as amended in scattered sections of
18, 26, 29 & 42 U.S.C.); 45 C.F.R. § 164-502 (2009).
200. 42 U.S.C. § 405(c)(2)(C)(viii) (2oo6).
2o. Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (2006). This Act does not
allow for a private right of action, but at least one court has implied a private right of action. Fay v. S.
Colonie Cent. Sch. Dist., 802 F.2d 21, 33-34 (2d Cir. 1986).
202. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2oo6).
203. Id. § 55i(a)(i).
204. Id. § 551(b)-(c). The restrictions on cable providers do not extend to instances in which cable
companies provide Internet service. See Klimas v. Comcast Cable Commc'ns, Inc., 465 F.3d 271, 2798o (6th Cir. 2oo6); see also AT&T Corp. v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 876-77 (9th Cir. 2ooo).
205. 47 U.S.C. § 222(c)(1) (2006). The Telecommunications Act does not apply to Internet service.
See BROWNLEE &WALESKI, supra note 188, § I:05[6] at 1-61.
206. 18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2oo6). The definition of protected data is broad and includes information on
any "protected computer." Id. § o3o(a)(2)(C). A "protected computer" is defined as any computer
that "is used in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce or communication." Id. § 103o(e)(2)(B).
207. 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (2006).

2o8. WOLF, supra note 184, § 2:8, at 2-82.

209.

15 U.S.C. §§

65o-6506 (2006).

182o0
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before it can collect, use, or disclose personal private information about
the children.1 o
These laws do a decent job of identifying the kinds of information
that need the most protection, but they do not go far enough. Major
categories of information that deserve protection have not been
addressed. Federal law has simply not kept up with the realities of
twenty-first century technological innovation. More must be done to
protect online activities from prying eyes and to prevent information
theft before it happens. And the federal government is in the best
position to do more. Unlike the states, Congress has the ability to create
uniform laws that will allow both businesses and consumers to be more
certain where they stand.
B.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

Congress has delegated authority to the FTC to stop unfair or
deceptive acts or practices. With that authority, the FTC requires the
proper disposal of private information,"' and under the Red Flags Rule,
the FTC has sought to prevent identity theft through more strict control
over how personal information is kept."' The FTC also launches
enforcement actions against companies that it deems to have engaged in
deceptive acts or practices." 3
The FTC, along with several other federal agencies, issued the Red
Flags Rule in late 2007.2' The rule requires all financial institutions and
creditors to implement programs designed to detect, prevent, and
mitigate identity theft in "covered accounts."" "Financial institutions"
are defined by reference to the Fair Credit Reporting Act"'6 and include
savings and loan associations, banks, and credit unions.." "Creditors" are
210. Id.
211.

16 C.F.R. § 682.3 (2010).

212. Id. § 681.i.

213. See In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., F.T.C. File No. o823o99 (Aug. 31, 20og) (holding Sears
responsible for collecting too much information about customers who volunteered to have some
information collected from them as they surfed the Internet); Sears Settles FTC Charges Regarding
Tracking Software, FTC (Jun. 4, 2009), http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2oo9/o6/sears.shtm.
214. 12 C.F.R. § 222.90 (2010); 16 C.F.R. § 681.2 (20I0).
215. A covered account is defined as:
(i) An account that a financial institution or creditor offers or maintains, primarily for
personal, family, or household purposes, that involves or is designed to permit multiple
payments or transactions, such as a credit card account, mortgage loan, automobile loan,
margin account, cell phone account, utility account, checking account, or savings account;
and (ii) Any other account that the financial institution or creditor offers or maintains for
which there is a reasonably foreseeable risk to customers or to the safety and soundness of
the financial institution or creditor from identity theft, including financial, operational,
compliance, reputation, or litigation risks.
12 C.F.R. § 222.90(b)(3).

216. Id. § 222.90(b)(7); see also 15 U.S.C.
217. 15 U.S.C. § 168ia(t).

§ 168ia(t) (2oo6).
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defined more broadly and include "lenders such as banks, finance
companies, automobile dealers, mortgage brokers, utility companies, and
telecommunications companies.2
The Red Flags Rule adopts a flexible structure for businesses to
design their own theft-prevention programs."' The rule simply requires
each covered institution to implement a program designed to prevent
identity theft.2 1o It provides some guidelines, 2 ' but essentially the rule
requires only that the program be "appropriate to the size and
complexity of the [institution] and the nature and scope of its
activities."...

The Red Flags Rule is a good start, but still leaves far too many
companies out. The rule applies only to financial and credit-giving
companies, leaving many customers outside its protection. And it
remains to be seen whether increasing the FTC's regulatory power will
be a good thing. The high-tech industry is worried that increased
authority would give the FTC too much power to levy massive fines on
those who are merely "aiding and abetting" those found in violation of
the rule."'
C. STATE LAWS
While the federal government has been somewhat cautious, in many
cases states have passed much more expansive and robust laws. States
have acted most aggressively in the attempt to prevent data theft and
identity theft. But states have not stopped there; many states, led by
California, have adopted statutes that govern the collection, use, and sale
of personal information.
Notification Laws
One of the most widely adopted state efforts in the regulation of
databases is mandatory notification in the event of a data-security
breach. 4 California was the first state to pass such a law, and more than
i.

218. 12 C.F.R. § 222.90(b)(5). "The term 'creditor' means any person who regularly extends,
renews, or continues credit; any person who regularly arranges for the extension, renewal, or
continuation of credit; or any assignee of an original creditor who participates in the decision to
extend, renew, or continue credit." 15 U.S.C. § 1691(a)(e) (2oo6).
219. See 12 C.F.R. § 222.90(C)-(f) (200).
220. See id.
221. See id. § 222.90(d)(2).
222. Id. § 222.90(d)(I).

223. Mike Shields, PatrollingBad Behavior, MEDIAWEEK, Mar. 22, 20IO, at 4.
224. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (2010); see also ARIz. REV. STAT. § 44-750 (20l); ARK. CODE ANN.

§ 4-I10-105
tit.

§ 10-1-912

(2ol); HAW. REv. STAT.

STAT. ANN.

§ 6-1-716 (2011); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-70b (2011); DEL. CODE
§ 28-3852 (2011); FLA. STAT. § 817.5681 (2011); GA. CODE ANN.
§ 4 8 7 N-2 (2008); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 28-105 (2004); 815 ILL. COMP.

(2o1); COLo. REV. STAT.
(2o1); D.C. CODE

6, § 12B-1o2

§ 530/to

(West 2008); IND. CODE § 24-4.9-3-1

Supp. 2011); KAN. STAT.

§ 50-7aO2

(2011); LA. REV. STAT.

(2011); IOWA CODE ANN

§ 51:3074

§ 715C.2

(West

(2011); ME. REV. STAT. tit. 1o,
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forty states have followed California's lead and passed their own statutes.
California's law provides that state residents must be given notice if there
is a security breach of unencrypted computer records that exposes their
private information."'
While these laws have proven useful in some instances, they contain
many loopholes. For example, most notification statutes require that
notice be given only in the event that unencrypted computer records are
stolen. Of the forty-four states that have these laws, only nine require
notification if encrypted data is stolen.226 And only two states require
notification any time there is a breach of personal data, regardless of the
format in which it is kept.2 There are other ways companies can avoid
the notification requirements. Connecticut allows companies to avoid
notification if, after "investigation and consultation with ... law
enforcement" the company "reasonably determines that the breach will
not likely result in harm.1122 8 Many states require notification only if the

§ 1348

(Supp. 2010); MD. CODE ANN., CoM. LAW § 14-3504 (LexisNexiS 2011); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch.
93H, §3 (West 2oo8); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445-72 (2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.61 (West Supp.
2010); MONT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1704 (2oo); NEB. REV. STAT. § 87-803 (2011); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 6o3A.220 (2009); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 359-C:20 (LexisNexiS 2008); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-163
(West Supp. 2011); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75-65 (West Supp.
20o0); N.D. CENT. CODE § 51-30-02 (2007); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1349-19 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011);
OKLA. STAT. tit 74, § 3113.1 (20II); OR. REV. STAT. § 646A.604 (2009); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2303
(West 2oo8); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-49.2-3 (Supp. 2oo); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-18-2107 (2011); TEX.
Bus. & CoM. CODE § 521.053 (2010); UTAH CODE § 13-44-202 (West 2011); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2435
(2011); VA. CODE § 18.2-186.6 (2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.255.010 (2011); W. VA. CODE ANN.
§ 46A-2A-102 (LexisNexis Supp. 2011); Wis. STAT. § 134.98 (2oo); Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 40-12-502
(2011); S.B. 453, 117th Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2oo8).
225. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82 (2oo). "Personal information" has a detailed definition under the
California law. It is the person's name in combination with her Social Security number, driver's license
number, information that would permit access to a person's financial accounts, medical information, or
health insurance information. Id. § 1798.82(e). Other states have more expansive definitions of what is
personal information. North Carolina has a particularly detailed definition. See N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN.
§ 14-113.20 (West Supp. 2010) ("'[Ildentifying information' as used in this [Note] includes the
following: (I) Social security or employer taxpayer identification numbers. (2) Drivers license, State
identification card, or passport numbers. (3) Checking account numbers. (4) Savings account numbers.

(5) Credit card numbers. (6) Debit card numbers. (7) Personal Identification (PIN) Code ....
(8) Electronic identification numbers, electronic mail names or addresses, Internet account numbers,
or Internet identification names. (9) Digital signatures. (so) Any other numbers or information that
can be used to access a person's financial resources. (ii) Biometric data. (12) Fingerprints.
(13) Passwords. (14) Parent's legal surname prior to marriage."); see also id. §H75-6(10o), 75-65(a).
226. ALASKA STAT. § 45-48.090(7) (2010); IND. CODE § 24-4.9-3-1(a)(2) (20II); MAsS. GEN. LAWS
ch. 93H, § z(a); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445-72(I)(b); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW § 899-aa(b); N.C. GEN. STAT.
ANN. § 75-61(14) (West Supp. 2010); 73 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 2303(b); VA. CODE § 18.2-i86.6(c);
W. VA. CODE ANN. § 46A-2A-IO2(b).
227. IND. CODE § 24-4.9-2-2 (2oi) (protecting "computerized data that have been transferred to

another medium, including paper, microfilm, or a similar medium, even if the transferred data are no
longer in a computerized format"); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-61(12) (2oo8) (requiring notice of breach of
data whether it is "written, drawn, spoken, visual, or electromagnetic information is recorded or
preserved, regardless of physical form or characteristics").
228. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-70ib(b) (2011).
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personal information is actually compromised.22 This is in contrast to
other states that require "acquisition" of data before the notification
requirement is triggered.23 o This distinction makes such acquisition laws
"appear more stringent." 3 ' Some states also require that the breach
materially compromise security before notification requirements become
effective.".
California and Utah each have an additional notification law. These
states require that businesses notify their customers when they intend to
disclose information about them to a third party for direct marketing
purposes or for compensation.3 California also requires credit card
issuers to allow their customers to opt out of disclosures to third
parties.234
Disposaland Minimum Security Statutes
In a further effort to prevent security theft, many states require the
secure disposal of private records.235 Kentucky's statute is a typical
example of these laws, which seek to prevent identity theft by making
sure that no private information falls into the wrong hands after it is
thrown away:23 6 "When a business disposes of ... any customer's
records ... the business shall take reasonable steps to destroy ... that
portion of the records containing personally identifiable information by
shredding, erasing, or otherwise modifying [the information] to make it
unreadable."237
A few states have gone even further to keep private information
from falling into the wrong hands. Several states now require a minimum
level of security anytime they hold personal information, whether it is
being disposed of or not."' These statutes are written in broad terms and
2.

229. WOLF, supra note 184, § 2:9.3[C], at 2-85; see, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 17 9 8.82(d).
230. WOLF, supra note 184, § 2:9.3[C], at 2-87 to 2-88; see, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 36a-7oib(a).
231. WOLF, supra note 184, § 2: 9 .3[C], at 2-88.
232. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. § 817.5681(4) (2011).
233. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.83 (2010); UTAH CODE § 13-37-201.
234. CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1748.10-1748.12.
235. ARiz. REV. STAT. § 44-7601 (2011); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-110-104(a) (2011); CAL. CIV. CODE
COLO. REV. STAT. § 6-1-713 (2011); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-15-2 (2011); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT.
ANN. § 5/16G-21 (West Supp. 2011); IND. CODE § 24-4-14-1 (2011); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 365-725
(West 2oo6); MD. CODE ANN., Com. LAW §§ 14-350-o6 (LexisNexis 2011); MICH. COMP. LAWS § 445-72
(2011); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325E.6i (West Supp. 2010); MoNT. CODE ANN. § 30-14-1703 (201o); NEV.

§ 1798.81;

§ 603A.2oo (2009); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-162 (West Supp. 2011); N.Y. GEN. Bus. LAW
§ 39 9 -h (2011); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 75.64 (West Supp. 20o); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-14-150(g)
(2011); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 521.053 (2010); UTAH CODE § 13-37-201; VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2445
(2011); WASH. REV. CODE § 19.215.020(l) (2011); Wis. STAT. § 137-97(2) (2010); 2oo5 R.I. Pub. Laws
225 (2oo8); H.B. 5694 § I, Reg. Sess. (Conn. 2009); S.B. 2292 § 2, 23rd Leg., Reg. Sess. (Haw. 2oo6);
S.B. 196, 8ist Leg., Reg. Sess., (Kan 2oo5); S.B. 583,74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007).
236. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 365-725.

REV. STAT.

237. Id.
238. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-o10-104(b); CAL. CIV. CODE

§ 1798.81.5;

NEV. REV. STAT.

§ 603A.210
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require businesses that hold personal information to implement
"reasonable security procedures ... appropriate to the nature of the
information."' All of the statutes use this "reasonable" language, which
is not defined, mirroring the approach taken by the FTC in its Red Flags
Rule.2 4o
3. FinancialInformation Statutes
States have stepped up to protect financial information as well, and
in many cases, go further than federal law.24 ' California is a good example
of a state that has myriad laws on financial privacy. These laws include
the state's Financial Information Privacy Act ("FIPA"),"' which in some
ways mirrors the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act but which has more
protection for customers.243 Unlike Gramm-Leach-Bliley," FIPA
requires customers to "opt-in" before businesses can share their
information with third parties.245 California also prevents disclosure of
bookkeeping records246 and tax returns.247
4. Internet-SpecificLegislation
Some states also have a host of laws that specifically protect
information collected over the Internet. California requires all websites
that collect personally identifiable information on state residents to
"conspicuously post" a privacy policy on their website.24' Willful or
(2oo9); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE § 521.053; UTAH CODE § 13-44-201 (2011); 2005 R.I. Pub. Laws 225;
S.B. 583, 74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007).
239. ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-IIo-104(b).
240. See 12 C.F.R. § 222.90 (2010).
241. KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 70.
242. CAL. FIN. CODE H§4050-4060 (2oo).
243. WOLF, supra note 184, § 2:9.3[A], at 2-83.
244. See 15 U.S.C. § 6802 (2oo6) (giving customers the option to opt-out of third-party sharing).
245. See CAL. FIN. CODE § 4052.5. FIPA also gives customers the ability to opt-out of sharing with
affiliates and subsidiaries. Id. § 4052.5(b)(I). The Ninth Circuit, however, ruled that this provision is
largely preempted by federal law. See Am. Bankers Ass'n v. Lockyer, 541 F.3d 1214, 1216 (9th Cir.
2oo8).
246. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1791.1 (2010).
247. Id. § 1799-1.
248. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22575(a) (20io). The privacy policy must:
(I) Identify the categories of personally identifiable information that the operator collects
through the Web site or online service about individual consumers who use or visit its

commercial Web site or online service and the categories of third-party persons or entities
with whom the operator may share that personally identifiable information. (2) If the
operator maintains a process for an individual consumer who uses or visits its commercial
Web site or online service to review and request changes to any of his or her personally
identifiable information that is collected through the Web site or online service, provide a
description of that process. (3) Describe the process by which the operator notifies
consumers who use or visit its commercial Web site or online service of material changes to
the operator's privacy policy for that Web site or online service. (4) Identify its effective
date.
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negligent violation of the posted policy is a violation of the statute.249
Two states require Internet service providers to keep their customers'
personal data private."o California has a law that prohibits spyware,
and at least thirteen other states have followed California's lead with
similar antispyware provisions.2 2
These state laws are spotty, sometimes provide limited protection,
and often contain worrisome loopholes. The encryption safe harbors are
particularly difficult to justify. However, these laws provide a good start
in addressing the real concerns of data collection. The data protection
statutes provide a possible framework for broader minimum security
standards that could be adopted by the FTC. And when it comes to laws
that govern the Internet, most companies are likely to adopt more
stringent state standards for fear of being sued under the strictest state
laws. However, undoubtedly there would be better protection and
greater certainty for business if the federal government were to institute
more uniform laws in these areas.
V. WORKING TOWARD A SOLUTION
As discussed above, any common law solution to the problems
posed by databases of personal information appears to be limited.
Congressional and state action have been helpful, but so far inadequate.
While there have been a multitude of statutes passed in recent years that
seek to address the problems of identity theft and the inappropriate
collection and use of personal information, the result has been a
smattering of overlapping laws that contain significant holes. The fact
that large categories of private information and businesses are not
covered by any law is particularly worrisome.
While it would seem that a radical solution is needed to deal with
this very real and growing problem, this Note takes a more moderate
position. This Note proposes that Congress create limited classes of
information that are zealously protected, that the FTC come up with a
better system to protect customers from the most unsavory business
practices, and that states and the FTC do more to protect personal

Id. § 22575(b).

249. Id. § 22576. The statute does not contain an enforcement provision; however, it is likely that
there is a private right of action under California's Unfair Competition Law. See WOLF, supra note
184, § 5:2.I[A], at 5-1I; see also CAL. Bus. &PROF. CODE §§ 17200-17210 (2010).
250. Minnesota protects "information that identifies: (I) a consumer by physical or electronic
address or telephone number; (2) a consumer as having requested or obtained specific materials or
services from an Internet service provider; (3) Internet or online sites visited by a consumer; or (4) any
of the contents of a consumer's data-storage devices." MINN. STAT. ANN. § 325M.OI(5) (West Supp.
20IO). Nevada's statute protects "all information" other than email addresses, which must be kept
confidential at the customer's request. NEv. REv. STAT § 205-498(i)(a) (2009).
251. CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 22947-22947.6 (2oo).
252. See WOLF, supra note 184, § 5:3.2, at 5-15.
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information from being stolen or lost. Most of these changes could be
implemented by broadening laws already in place and following the best
state practices.
There are several reasons that these changes would be best
implemented by the legislative branch and federal administrative
agencies, rather than by the courts. First is the recognition that this is a
rapidly developing area of business and technology. Heavy-handed court
decisions could destroy the legitimate and productive uses of the vast
quantity of information produced in our information-saturated world.2 53
Second is the hope that allowing Congress and regulatory agencies to
decide how to proceed will produce more carefully crafted andhopefully- cautious rules. Third, Congress and administrative agencies
represent the branches of government that are arguably best equipped to
make policy decisions about how better to protect the privacy interests of
Americans without harming business.
This Note proposes that the problem be broken into four parts:
(I) collection of private data, (2) the internal use of private data, (3) the
sale or rental of personal data, and (4) keeping data in an insecure
manner that exposes it to loss and theft. Each of these activities presents
different problems and requires tailored solutions.
A.

DATA COLLECTION

Companies collect data in the regular course of business. This is true
in all but anonymous cash-only transactions. Paying with a credit card,
ordering by mail or through the Internet, or establishing almost any
relationship with a business is bound to leave a record of the customer's
name and address, at least. The deeper the relationship, the more data is
likely to be collected and stored. Banks, healthcare providers,
accountants, and lawyers have detailed information on their customers.
Employers also have vast amounts of information about their employees.
This sort of data collection and storage seems unavoidable. Simply
conducting normal business activities will produce these records. These
records are largely needed by the companies collecting them; laws
limiting collection would likely be burdensome and difficult to comply
with. Still, some regulation in this area is appropriate.

253. Courts are particularly bad at understanding even the basics of technology. The oral
argument in City of Ontario v. Quan provides a particularly striking example. See generally Transcript
of Oral Argument, City of Ontario v. Quan, 130 S. Ct. 2619 (2olo) (No. o8-1332). During the hearing,
several Supreme Court Justices made comments that revealed how little they knew about text
messages and email. For example, Justice Scalia wondered if text messages could be printed out "and
circulated"- apparently unaware of the concept of forwarding. Id. at 49. Justices Kennedy and
Roberts did not understand what would happen if one were to send a text message at the same time
one received one. Kennedy asked if you would get a voicemail message. Id. at 44.

Jul1y 20II]

SOMEONE IS WATCHING

1827

The Children's Online Privacy Protection Act is an example of a law
that identifies a narrow exception to the general rule that almost any
collection of information in a business context should be allowed.254 With
this Act, Congress reasonably determined that businesses should be
forced to get a parent's permission before collecting information on
children."' While the Act has the unfortunate problem of providing little
guidance on which websites are covered by the law,25 6 it is exactly the
type of limitation on collection that will protect a vulnerable population
without being overly burdensome on businesses. Similarly appropriate
restrictions on collection are the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act' and
various state spyware statutes."' These laws identify activities that are
not simply information collection, but intrusions into private space.
Legislatures have correctly recognized the difference between collecting
information in arms-length transactions and collecting information by
invading a person's computer without her permission.
The Cable Communications Policy Act"' also contains limits on the
collection of information. While the goal of ensuring the privacy of what
one watches in her home is important, legislatures should be careful
before extending the Act's collection restrictions into other areas, such as
the Internet. While the sharing of Internet browsing and search
information should be better regulated,6 the initial collection and
internal use of that information is vital to many companies. Regulating
the collection of such information should be done only in the most
extreme circumstances, with the presumption being that data collection
should be almost universally allowed.
The default position in all areas should be to permit the collection of
information. Regulating collection alone would likely create difficulty in
enforcement and in line drawing. While other data-handling practices
should be more tightly regulated, collection alone is not the best place to
control the behavior of private data usage.
B.

INTERNAL DATA USE

Once data is collected, it is often used for legitimate business
purposes by the companies that collect it. This has been going on for
decades 6 ' and has only accelerated with the introduction of highpowered computing. 6 , Companies use the extensive data they collect in
254.
255.
256.
257.

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 6501-6506 (2oo6).
Id.
KENNEDY, supra note 5, at 14-15.

18 U.S.C. § 1030 (2oo6).
258. See supra Part IV.C. 4 .
259. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2oo6).
260. See infra Part V.C.
261. See SOLOVE, supra note 2, at 16-17.
262. Lohr, supra note 5, at BU3.
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remarkable ways. Canadian Tire uses data from its credit card customers
to determine whether or not they are likely to repay their loans.'6 AT&T
uses demographic data to predict the amount of traffic that each
subscriber adds to its cellular network.6 For some Internet companies,
customer data provides the basis for ads that generate much of their

revenue.265

It has been shown time and again that this information, if used
responsibly, can have surprising social benefits. For example, Google
search queries have been used to accurately track flu outbreaks.*
Google accurately estimates the level of flu activity in a region with a lag
time of just one day. This sort of capability would have been extremely
difficult to predict when Google was launched and would likely be much
more difficult if laws such as the Do Not Track list were enacted.
The in-house use of collected information is vital to many industries
and should not be infringed upon. As long as there are adequate
protections against the alienation and loss of data, the government
should be cautious in any attempt to regulate the internal use of
information legally collected by companies.
However, the definition of "internal use" must be addressed. While
allowing almost unfettered use of internal data should be the default
position of lawmakers, subsidiaries and affiliated organizations should
not always be treated as the same organization. With the consolidation of
companies in general-and high-tech Internet companies in particularperhaps opt-out provisions like those in California should be considered.
When it comes to sharing among affiliates and subsidiaries, opt-out
provisions protect the most sensitive customers while still protecting
business interests. The most sensitive customers can simply opt-out of

263. Charles Duhigg, What Does Your Credit-CardCompany Know About You?, N.Y. TIMES, May
17, 2009, at MM 4 o. The company figured out that

people who bought cheap, generic automotive oil were much more likely to miss a creditcard payment than someone who got the expensive, name-brand stuff. People who bought
carbon-monoxide monitors for their homes or those little felt pads that stop chair legs from
scratching the floor almost never missed payments. Anyone who purchased a chrome-skull
car accessory or a 'Mega Thruster Exhaust System' was pretty likely to miss paying his bill
eventually.
Id.
264. Niraj Sheth, A T&T PreparesNetwork for Battle, WALL Sr. J., Mar. 31, 201o, at BI.
265. See Claire Cain Miller, Twitter Unveils Plans to Draw Money from Ads, N.Y. TIMEs, Apr. 12,
201o, at BI (discussing Twitter's plan to sell advertising based on searches); see also Jefferson Graham,
Businesses Turn to Facebookfor Word-of-Mouth Advertising, USA TODAY, Aug. 5, 2009, at 7A ("You
can target your ad better on Facebook than anywhere else. I know my customers' age, where they live,
what their interests are, and only the people who fit my target see the ads." (quoting Facebook
advertiser Cam Balzer)).
266. Jeremy Ginsberg et al., Detecting Influenza Epidemics Using Search Engine Query Data,
457 NATURE 1012, 1012 (2009).

267. Id. at 1014.
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any affiliate sharing programs while businesses will be content knowing
that the vast majority of their customers will not take the step to opt-out.
C.

INFORMATION SALE AND RENTAL

The sale and rental of personal information to third parties is
troubling, but legislatures and regulators must approach restrictions with
care. The sale and rental of data is a large business that many companies
depend on for sales and marketing information.'6 The best approach
would be one that largely preserves the status quo while putting a stop to
the worst practices of the industry. This can be done through an
extension of laws already in place.
As it stands, most laws that limit which information can be
disseminated to third parties focus on the type of information involved.
These laws seek to protect information that Congress or state legislatures
deem too private to share. Many of these laws protect financial
information by limiting which information can be shared and with whom.
Other laws create total or near-total bans on dissemination of certain kinds
of information. These types include information on a person's health,69
video rental activities,"o television watching,' and communications.
Whether by design or by chance, these particular types of information are
more personal than unprotected information. One's media consumption
habits, bank statements, and communications have the potential to
reveal one's inner thoughts and bodily condition. They are the sort of
private information we would be unwilling to give to all but our closest
friends and family members. This rationale could easily be extended to
Internet searches, website histories, information uploaded to social
networking sites, or mobile phone location and usage information. In
2oo6, America Online released twenty million of its members' Internet
search queries as part of a research project. 7 ' Looking at these search
histories gives you the feeling of being inside someone's head. The
thoughts and feelings of the individual can easily be discerned from the
searches. 2 74 The searches show everything from the user's interests in
note 2, at I.
269. E.g., 42 U.S.C. § 201 (2oo6); 45 C.F.R. 164-501 (2010).
270. i8 U.S.C. § 2710 (2oo6).
271. 47 U.S.C. § 551 (2oo6).
272. 12 C.F.R. § 222(C)(I) (200).
268. SOLOVE, supra

273. Declan McCullagh, AOL's Disturbing Glimpse into Users' Lives, CNET, Aug. 7, 2006,
http://news.cnet.com/AOLs-disturbing-glimpse-into-users-lives/2100-ro303-6lo3098.html.
274. A CNET reporter combed the AOL search data and found some fairly disturbing examples of
just how personal one's Internet search history can be. Id. ("AOL user 9486162 appears to live near
Edisto Beach, S.C., and could be a poker aficionado who's a fan of the University of Kentucky's
football team. User 9486162 rarely used his or her AOL account for searching in March, but was
preoccupied with one disturbing topic on April 26: university of kentucky football; hold'em poker
school; ways to kill yourself; suicide by natural gas; how to kill oneself by natural gas; assisted suicide;
suicide by overdosing; how long does carbon monoxide poisoning take to kill a person; over dose ways
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particular sports teams to thoughts of suicide."' The rationale that some
information is so private that it essentially offers a window into a
person's mind and thus should not be shared was behind the passage of
the Video Privacy Protection Act, which bans the dissemination of video
rental history.76
Senator Paul Simon's comments in May 1988 about the Video
Privacy Protection Act could easily be mistaken for criticism of the kind
of high-tech data collection being done today:
There is no denying that the computer age has revolutionized our
world. Over the past 20 years we have seen remarkable changes in the
way each one of us goes about our lives. Our children learn through
computers. We bank by machine. We watch movies in our living
rooms. These technological innovations are exciting and as a nation we
should be proud of the accomplishments we have made.
Yet, as we continue to move ahead, we must protect time honored
values that are so central to this society, particularly our right to
privacy. The advent of the computer means not only that we can be
more efficient than ever before, but that we have the ability to be more
intrusive than ever before. Every day Americans are forced to provide
to businesses and others personal information without having any
control over where that information goes. These records are a window
into our loves, likes, and dislikes.
The Video Privacy Protection Act came about after the Washington City
Paper published the video rental records of then-Supreme Court
nominee Judge Robert Bork.7' The Act was introduced less than a
month later."
There's a gut feeling that people ought to be able to read books and
watch films without the whole world knowing. Books and films are the
intellectual vitamins that fuel the growth of individual thought. The
whole process of intellectual growth is one of privacy-of quiet, and
reflection. This intimate process should be protected from the
disruptive intrusion of a roving eye.

to commit suicide; university of kentucky 2007 football recruits; texas hold'em poker on line seminars;
employment needed-louisville ky"). The CNET article also revealed the search history of someone
searching for child porn, someone looking to get revenge on a boyfriend, and a woman struggling with
self-image issues and pregnancy. Id.; see also Michael Barbaro & Tom Zeller, Jr., A Face Is Exposed
for AOL SearcherNo. 4417749, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 9, 2oo6, at Ai (showing how easy it is to figure out
the true identity of a supposedly anonymous user by analyzing her search information).
275. McCullagh, supra note 274.
276. i8 U.S.C. § 2710 (2oo6).
277. S. REP. No. 100-599, at 6-7 (1988) (quoting 134 CONG. REC. S54o (daily ed. May io, 1988)

(statement of Senator Paul Simon)).
278. Michael Dolan, The Bork Tapes, WASH. CITY PAPER, Sept. 25-Oct. I, 1987, at I; see also
Editorial:Invasion of Video Privacy, WASH. PosT, Sept. 30, 1987, at A18.
279. Dennis McDougal, Video Rental Privacy Bill Introduced, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 23, 1987, at I
(Calendar).
280. S. REP. No. 100-599, at 7 (statement of Rep. Alfred McCandless).
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These sentiments are even more true when it comes to the Internet.
Would the reaction to the release of a prominent public official's
Internet search and browsing history be any different than the reaction
to the release of Bork's video rental history? If anything, it would likely
be worse.
This is not to say that such information should not be collected or
used by the companies that collect it. Much of the Internet search
industry relies on this information to better hone its search capabilities.
However, this information should not be shared. As Congress recognized
with the Video Privacy Act, there is some information that is simply too
personal to be disseminated.
Banning the sale and rental of private information is not a perfect
solution, but it provides the best balance between privacy and business
innovation. Allowing companies virtually unfettered use of the data they
collect allows them to continue to innovate. Banning the dissemination
of that data, however, keeps it contained. This containment has several
benefits. First, it allows the customer or web surfer to know that her data
will be available only to companies that she does business with or visits.
This presumably will give those concerned about the spread of their
private information the reassurance that-at the very least-it will be
available only to those they trust enough to give it to in the first place.
Second, if such a ban were coupled with more stringent data security
laws, it would create some assurance that the collector of that data is
responsible for keeping it safe and is unable to share it with another
person or entity that might not be as careful. Third, a ban makes it less
likely that separate strands of data will be pieced together to discover
personal information about a person that she had no intention of sharing.
For example, it would prevent a data broker from combining GPS
information from a mobile phone company with credit card purchase
histories to map out a customer's shopping route and determine what she
looked at before she made a purchase. This reduces the danger to
personal privacy posed by "digital dossiers," because they would be
much harder to assemble.
D.

DATA THEFT

There are two ways to attack the problem of data theft. Laws can try
either to prevent data theft before it happens, or to prevent further harm
to those whose data has been compromised. Current state and federal
law, as well as regulations promulgated by the FTC, could be much more
robust in both of these areas.
On data loss prevention, the FTC's Red Flags Rule could be much
more robust. Considering that the objective is to protect private
information being held by more than just financial and credit-giving
companies, the rule should be extended to all businesses that hold such
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information. A Red Flags Rule that more closely resembles state
28,
statutes in this area would be helpful. The FTC should place any
business that holds private information under a duty to use reasonable
measures to safeguard that data, because companies that are not defined
as financial institutions or credit-giving hold vast quantities of
information. In fact, many would argue that the information held by
institutions, such as Internet search engines, is more private than the
information held by financial institutions. While the loss of private
financial information could be damaging in terms of dollars and cents,
the privacy implications of the loss of what amounts to private thoughts
and interests is much more invasive.
Laws protecting customers once their data has been released are
much more effective than the FTC's current regulations, but could be
improved. As it stands, most states give companies safe harbor from
breach notification laws if they use encryption technology.8'2 But whether
the data is lost or stolen from an encrypted system or from a
nonencrypted one, the customers' data is just as vulnerable. If the
objective is to give notice to customers that their data has been
compromised, it should not matter how the data was stored before it was
stolen. This is not to say that there should be no incentives for companies
to encrypt their data or to promote best practices, but notification laws
should not be used to provide such incentives. Safe harbors might be
better used to protect companies from lawsuits or regulatory action.
There also is no good reason to limit notification laws to information
stored on computers. Only two states require notification if the stolen
data was not kept on a computer, and only one of those two requires no
tie to a computer for breach notification to be mandatory."' Again, if the
purpose of notification laws is to alert potential identity-theft victims that
their data has been compromised, laws must be expanded to include all
data breaches, no matter how the information is stored.
Notification laws, however, are inadequate without satisfactory
protection from theft in the first place. Once the information is out, it is
often up to the consumer to make sure the proper steps are taken to
protect their identity. That is why there must be more stringent
protections on data: so it is less likely to be stolen in the first place.5 4
Stronger protections, in conjunction with adequate notification laws,

281. ARK. CODE ANN. §4-I io-io4(b) (2011); CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.81.5 (2010); NEV. REV. STAT.
(2009); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE §521.053 (2010); UTAH CODE § 13-44-201 (2011); 2005 R.I.
Pub. Laws 225 (2008); S.B. 583,74th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Or. 2007).
282. See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1798.82(a) (2010).
283. CONN. GEN. STAT. §36a-70b (2ol).
284. Data theft prevention might be accomplished through a more stringent FTC Red Flags Rule,

§603A.210

which could require better information protection practices such as the mandatory use of encryption
technology.
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would go a long way toward limiting this growing financial and privacy
threat.

E.

A CONSTITUIONAL LIMITATION
Any proposed solution to the problem of data sales must confront
the limitations imposed by the First Amendment. As discussed in
relation to the tort of public disclosure, the First Amendment restricts
the ability of legislatures to limit the dissemination of truthful
information.s This limitation was on display most recently in Sorrell v.
IMS Health Inc., in which the Court struck down a limitation on the use
and dissemination of prescription drug information, holding that the ban
was an unconstitutional limitation on commercial speech.286
Two aspects of the Vermont statute at issue in Sorrell raised
constitutional problems. First, it barred the sale of prescription
information to those who would use it for marketing purposes. The
Court held this to be a content-based restriction because it singled out a
particular disfavored type of speech-marketing."" Second, the law
barred pharmaceutical manufacturers from using the information for
marketing purposes. The Court held that this limitation was speakerbased because it singled out a disfavored speaker-pharmaceutical
manufacturers. Because the law contained content- and speaker-based
restrictions, the Court imposed heightened scrutiny, requiring the
government to show that the law "directly advance[d] a substantial
governmental interest and that the measure [was] drawn to achieve that
interest."2" Vermont argued that the statute was "necessary to protect
medical privacy," but this justification did not withstand heightened
scrutiny." The Court suggested that the need for privacy could well be a
substantial interest but that the statute was "not drawn to serve that
interest.""9 ' The law allowed for wide dissemination of prescription
information-for health care research, for example-to a large number
of individuals, including "insurers, researchers, journalists, and the state
itself."29 2 Thus, because of the "information's widespread availability and
many permissible uses," the "asserted interest in physician confidentiality
[did] not justify the burden [the statute] places on protected expression."293
285. See supra Part I.B.
286. No. 10-779, slip. op. at I (U.S. June 23, 2011).

287. Id. slip op. at 8.
288. Id.
289. Id. slip op. at 15-16.
290. Id. slip op. at 17. The State also argued that the statute was integral to improving public health
and reducing healthcare costs. Id.
291. Id. ("It may be assumed that, for many reasons, physicians have an interest in keeping their
prescription decisions confidential.").
292. Id.
293. Id. slip op. at 3.
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However, in the majority opinion Justice Kennedy left the door
open for some laws that restrict companies from disclosing personal
information. He did so by first noting the danger posed by data storage in
the computer age:
The capacity of technology to find and publish personal
information ... presents serious and unresolved issues with respect to
personal privacy and the dignity it seeks to secure. In considering how
to protect those interests, however, the State cannot enga e in contentbased discrimination to advance its own side of a debate.
He then hinted that Vermont's law might have passed constitutional
muster if it had "provided that prescriber-identifying information could
not be sold or disclosed except in narrow circumstances."" In doing so,
Kennedy cited the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act,
which is one of the models this Note suggests building upon to protect a
wider array of private information.
In Sorrell, the Court suggested strongly that personal privacy can be
a substantial government interest.2 " Furthermore, Justice Kennedy seems
to leave open the possibility that general bans on the dissemination of
personal information while allowing a "few narrow and well-justified"
exceptions would advance that interest.20 That is precisely what this Note
recommends.
F.

COMPETING PROPOSALS

Recently, there have been two high-profile proposals seeking to
curtail the threat to individual privacy that the Internet poses. First, the
FTC proposed a so-called "Do Not Track" scheme whereby individuals
could opt out of online tracking, most likely through the use of software
installed on their computer.2" Second, Senators John Kerry and John
McCain have begun distributing a working draft of the "Commercial
Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011," a rather comprehensive proposal that
would address data security, data use, and data collection." However,
both of these proposals have shortcomings that make them less appealing
than the solution this Note proposes.

294.
295.
296.
297.

Id. slip op. at 24.
Id. slip op. at 24-25.
Id. slip op. at I8.

Id. slip op. at 24.
298. Id. slip op. at I8.
299. FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY IN AN ERA OF RAPID CHANGE 63-67 (201o) [hereinafter
FTC, PRoTEcrING CONSUMER PRIVACY].
300. John L. Kerry & John S. McCain, Staff Working Draft of the Commercial Privacy Bill of
Rights Act of 2011, KERRY.SENATE.Gov (Mar. II 201), http://kerry.senate.gov/imolmedialdoc/
Commercial%2oPrivacy%2oBill%2oof%2oRights%2oText.pdf.
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Do Not Track
Recently, the FTC lobbied Congress to enact so-called "Do Not
Track" legislation.3 o' Since then, H.R. 654 has been introduced.o2 This bill
would allow any web user to choose whether or not online companies
could collect information about their Internet use.3" Such a law has been
compared to the successful "Do Not Call" list established in 2003,o4 but
5 Users would probably
the mechanism would likely be quite different."o
set a preference on their web browser or use a piece of software that
would signal to websites that they have opted out of data collecting.
The Do Not Track list is a substantial break with the FTC's previous
efforts to protect customers' private information. In the past, the FTC
has used enforcement actions to protect customers' private information.30
In the 199os, the FTC relied chiefly on the concept of "notice and
choice,"" which looks at whether the consumer has been given adequate
notice as to how their information has been collected and the choice
whether or not to be involved.'" Since the early 2000S, the Commission
has used the "harm-based approach," which focuses on whether there
was any actual harm done to the consumer.3" This harm-based approach,
however, does not take into account intangible harms, a serious
drawback."'o To its credit, the FTC has rejected these past frameworks,
which have proven to be inadequate in protecting consumers' private
information. The FTC has recognized that the notice and choice model
led only to long, increasingly difficult-to-understand notices that were of
little help to the average web user."' The harm-based approach is not any
better. The FTC now recognizes that much of the harm done by data
collection and dissemination is "reputational harm, as well as the fear of
being monitored or simply having private information 'out there.'"..
i.

301. See Prepared Statement of the FTC on Do Not Track: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Commerce, Trade, and Consumer Protection, I12th Cong. (2010) (statement of David Vladeck,
Director of the Bureau of Consumer Protection of the FTC).
302. H.R. 654, I12th Cong. (2011).
303. Id.

304. See Edward Wyatt & Tanzina Vega, FTC Backs Plan to Honor Privacy of Online Users, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 1, 20oo, at Ai.

305. The proposed law does not spell out how users would be able to opt-out of data collection,
something that would be left to FTC rulemaking.
306. See, e.g., In re Sears Holdings Mgmt. Corp., F.T.C. File No. o823099 (Aug. 31, 20o9).
307. FTC, PRIVACY ONLINE: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 7-9 (1998).

308. David Vladeck, Director FTC Bureau of Consumer Protection, The Role of the FTC in
Consumer Privacy Protection at the International Association of Privacy Professionals Practical
Privacy Series 2 (Dec. 8, 2009), transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/vladeck.
309. Id. at 3.
31o. The harm-based approach looked for "physical harm, economic harm in the form of identity

theft or denial of credit, or unwarranted intrusions into people's daily lives." Id.
311. See FTC, PROTECTING CONSUMER PRIVACY, supra note 299, at 19-20.

312. Id. at 2o.

HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

1836

[Vol. 62:1793

The Do Not Track legislation is not the answer to these problems.
The proposal goes both too far and not far enough. First, it goes too far
in that it will severely limit what a collector of information can do with it.
As noted in Part V.B above, this is a somewhat drastic measure to take.
The in-house use of collected information is the lifeblood of the
information age and of many high-tech companies. 3 The law does have
exceptions including any "category of operational use specified by the
Commission by regulation that is consistent with the purposes [of the
law]." 3 14 But the extent of these exceptions will be left largely to the
interpretation of the FTC and subject to lawsuits. Such uncertainty is
exactly the sort of thing that should be avoided if the United States is to
maintain a healthy high-tech industry. Second, Do Not Track does not go
far enough because it requires users to opt out. Most users are unlikely to
do so. Opt-out provisions create an extra step that many unsophisticated
users will not understand or know how to implement. Those users who
are most at risk for privacy invasion are those who are the least
technically proficient and the least likely to opt out. These are often the
elderly or others with limited technical abilities.' A more sensible
solution would be to allow data collection and protect privacy through
other means.
Privacy Bill of Rights
The "online privacy bill of rights," as currently proposed, would
require data collectors to: (I) establish "reasonable security measures" to
protect their data; (2) give individuals notice regarding the "collection,
use, transfer, or maintenance" of the data collected about them;
(3) require opt-in consent for the "collection, use, or transfer of sensitive
personally identifiable information other than to process a transaction or
service requested by that individual or for fraud prevention ... or to
provide for a secure environment"; (4) allow individuals to inspect and
correct any information possessed about them; (5) collect only as much
information as they need and retain that information only as long as
needed; and (6) require all third parties with whom they share
information to maintain it just as the collector would, and require that
2.

313. Ron A. Dolin, Search Query Privacy: The Problem of Anonymization, 2 HASTINGS SCI. &
TECH.

L.J.

137, 142-48 (2010).

314. H.R. 654, 112th. Cong. § 3(d)(7) (2011).

315. An example of just how unsophisticated many elderly users are comes from America Online's
customer base. AOL still derives a substantial portion of its profits from customers who pay for dialup Internet access. Most of these users already have high-speed DSL or cable service but do not know
they can stop paying AOL twenty-five dollars a month. Ken Auletta, You've Got News, NEW YORKER,
Jan. 24, 201I, at 32. "The dirty little secret," a former AOL executive told the New Yorker, "is that
seventy-five per cent of the people who subscribe to AOL's dial-up service don't need it." Id. It is
unlikely that millions of online users like those who still use AOL would be sophisticated enough to
understand the privacy implications of data collection, let alone how to properly opt-out.
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the third party not combine the information with information from other
sources in order to identify particular individuals.3 6
There are at least two praiseworthy proposals in the draft
legislation. First, the online bill of rights targets data security, collection,
use, and dissemination all at once'7-a feature almost unique in data
protection legislation. The comprehensive nature of the legislation would
be greatly appreciated by businesses that are now forced to follow
myriad state and federal laws covering all of these issues independently.
Second, the online bill of rights would prompt the FTC to establish
better security rules for businesses. While the online bill of rights leaves
almost all of the specifics to the FTC, it does provide the Commission
with a chance to improve upon the flawed Red Flags Rule.
However, the proposal fails in a number of ways. First, the notice
and correction provisions, while interesting, are unlikely to provide any
help to consumers. These notices will not likely be any clearer or more
helpful than the complicated and rarely used notices already required by
banks and other financial institutions. Such notice requirements will only
add burdens to business without actually helping to prevent the most
invasive practices of data collectors.
Second, the opt-in provision is worrying in several respects. The
draft legislation requires individuals to opt-in even for the collection of
''sensitive personally identifiable information." The proposal defines this
as "personally identifiable information which, if lost, compromised or
disclosed without authorization could result in harm to an individual." '5
The word "harm" is never defined. If "harm" includes emotional or
reputational harm, it would include almost any piece of information that
could cause someone emotional difficulty. If "harm" does not include
emotional harm, the legislation is no better than the harm-based
approach tried and rejected by the FTC. The opt-in requirement also is
likely to do real harm to businesses. Even those who do not mind having
their personal information collected are unlikely to give an institution
affirmative permission to track them. Without this information, Internet
companies in particular are going to lose a valuable source of income.
Senator Claire McCaskill, a Missouri Democrat, expressed worries that
these restrictions could hinder the ability of websites to provide free
content: "I just want to make sure that we don't kill the goose that laid
3 19
the golden egg," she told the Wall Street Journal.
There is no reason to
316. The proposal would not apply to all collectors. Instead, it would apply only to entities
collecting information on 5ooo individuals during a twelve month period, and only to those entities
that meet other requirements listed in the proposal. John L. Kerry & John S. McCain, Staff Working
Draft of the Commercial Privacy Bill of Rights Act of 2011, KERRY.SENATE.Gov (Mar. I1 2011),

http://kerry.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Commercial%2oPrivacy%2oBill%200f%2oRights%2oText.pdf.
317. Kerry & McCain, supra note 316, § 2o2(a)(i)(A).
318. Id. § 3(5).
319. Jennifer Valentino-DeVries, Privacy Measure Attracts Support, WALL ST. J., Mar. 17,2011, at Bi.
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go this far. Simply requiring data collectors to keep personal data safe
and prohibiting them from selling it to others would provide muchneeded protection while also allowing some of the world's most
innovative companies to stay in business. The solution proposed by this
Note strikes this balance and provides a simple rule that businesses could
easily follow.
CONCLUSION

The problem of data collection and dissemination is real, but courts
and legislatures should be cautious in how they go about solving it.
Courts should be especially cautious in using privacy torts, breach of
confidence, or any property rights to address the problem. Doing so
would expand those doctrines far beyond their breaking point. Instead,
legislatures and administrative agencies should carefully address the
most troublesome privacy concerns with well-targeted, limited laws and
regulations. This may well include expanding the categories of
information subject to heightened protection and strengthening laws
designed to prevent identity theft. As information becomes more readily
available and easier to transmit, the data-collection problem will only
become more acute. Regulators and lawmakers need to recognize this
fact and move quickly toward more enhanced protections -including a
ban on the sale of private information.

